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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court of the United States based its landmark
decision in Shelby County v. Holder on the proposition that the
Constitution contains “a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
among the States.” For the central holding of a blockbuster
constitutional case, that assertion was surprisingly unsupported. The
Court simply declared it to be true and made little effort to
substantiate it. That naked conclusion prompted savage criticism not
only from the left, but also from the right. The consensus critical
reaction was epitomized by Judge Richard Posner’s remark that “the
court’s invocation of ‘equal sovereignty’ is an indispensable prop of
the decision. But . . . there is no doctrine of equal sovereignty. The
opinion rests on air.” Critics also worried that, because there are
countless federal laws that can be said to treat the states disparately,
the Court’s brand-new equal sovereignty principle is, as Justice
Ginsburg put it in her strident dissent, “capable of much mischief.”
This Article contends that the critics of Shelby County are only half
right—and that the Shelby County majority, despite its cursory
analysis, is half right too. The critics are correct that the Court
seemingly pulled the equal sovereignty principle out of thin air—that
it played a little too fast and loose with precedent and failed to wrestle
adequately with constitutional text, structure, and history.
Nonetheless, this Article concludes—after performing the thorough
examination of the traditional sources of constitutional law that was
missing from the ipse dixit of Shelby County—that there is indeed a
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deep principle of equal sovereignty that runs through the Constitution.
In James Madison’s words, the Constitution contemplates “a
government of a federal nature, consisting of many coequal
sovereigns.” Properly understood, however, the equal sovereignty
principle is not a guarantee of state equality in all respects. It
guarantees only equal sovereignty—that is, equal capacity for selfgovernment—which makes it more fundamental, but also less
expansive, than critics have feared.
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INTRODUCTION
1

In Shelby County v. Holder, a sharply divided Supreme Court of
the United States struck down a portion of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as reauthorized in 2006, on the ground that the statute
discriminatorily imposed onerous limitations on election-based state
lawmaking in some states—the “covered jurisdictions”—but not

1. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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2

others. This the Constitution will not tolerate, explained Chief
Justice Roberts on behalf of the five-Justice majority, because “[n]ot
only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also
3
a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”
For the central holding of a blockbuster constitutional case, that
assertion was surprisingly unsupported. The Court simply declared it
4
to be true, and made little effort to substantiate it. That naked
statement prompted savage criticism not only from the left, but also
5
from the right. Typical of the liberal response were the remarks of
David Gans of the Constitutional Accountability Center, who ripped
the Court for “[i]gnoring the actual Constitution” by relying on a
“principle of equal sovereignty of the states,” despite the fact that “no
6
such principle exists.” “No matter how many times one reads our
Constitution,” Gans declared, “the simple fact is that there is no
2. See id. at 2622–28 (striking down the “coverage formula” established by Section 4 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 70 Stat. 438, previously codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)).
3. Id. at 2623 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203
(2009)).
4. See Eric Posner, John Roberts’ Opinion on the Voting Rights Act is Really Lame, SLATE
(June 25, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/
features/2013/supreme_court_2013/supreme_court_on_the_voting_rights_act_chief_justice_
john_roberts_struck.html [http://perma.cc/UH7N-98E4] (“Yet Roberts is able to cite only the
weakest support for this principle—a handful of very old cases that address entirely different
matters. None of the usual impressive array of founding authorities show up in his analysis, even
though the founding generation took state sovereignty much more seriously than we do
today.”).
5. See Edward Cantu, The Roberts Court and Penumbral Federalism, 64 CATH. U. L. REV.
271, 310 (2015) (noting that scholars “were virtually unanimous in their rejection of equal
sovereignty as a legitimate and controlling aspect of either the Court’s federalism jurisprudence
or the meaning of the Constitution as an original matter,” and asserting that, “[a]ccording to a
vast majority of commentators, equal sovereignty as a constitutional rule was implausible and
the product of rhetorical trickery”); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active
Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2133 n.103
(2015) (“The legal commentariat generally viewed the doctrine as an invention.”).
6. David H. Gans, In Recent Rulings, Supreme Court Views Constitution’s Promise in
Vastly Different Ways, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J. (July 7, 2013), https://theusconstitution.org/
news/recent-rulings-supreme-court-views-constitutions-promises-vastly-different-ways [https://
perma.cc/GN7Q-KAW3]; see also Edward Cantu, The Separation-of-Powers and the Least
Dangerous Branch, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 (2015) (“[T]he ‘fundamental principle of
equal sovereignty’ is clearly not.”); Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 175, 177 (2013) (“This principle has a nice ring to it. But as a constraint on the federal
government’s power to treat states unequally, it has no basis either in constitutional text or in
existing constitutional doctrine.”); Jon Greenbaum, Alan Martinson & Sonia Gill, Shelby
County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 846–54 (2014)
(arguing that the equal sovereignty principle is utterly lacking in support); Richard L. Hasen,
Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 714, 733
(2014) (referring to the equal sovereignty principle as “unjustified” and “made up”).
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‘Equality of States Clause’ in it. Such an amendment might be on
many conservatives’ wish lists, but it is simply not part of the
7
Constitution.” Stanford Law School’s Michael McConnell offered a
similar (if less inflammatory) critique from a conservative perspective:
“This is a nice idea; it might be on my list of desirable constitutional
8
amendments. But it is not in the Constitution we have.” The
consensus critical reaction was epitomized by Judge Richard Posner’s
remark that “the court’s invocation of ‘equal sovereignty’ is an
indispensable prop of the decision. But . . . there is no doctrine of
9
equal sovereignty. The opinion rests on air.”
In an incredulous dissent, Justice Ginsburg opined that the
Court’s brand-new equal sovereignty principle was not only utterly
10
made up, but also “capable of much mischief.” She listed a number
of federal statutes that treat the states disparately and thus appear to
be imperiled by the Court’s revolutionary new principle. First among
them was the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of
1992 (PASPA), which prohibits sports gambling, but exempts Nevada
11
from its scope. As it happens, PASPA was at that moment being
12
challenged in litigation by the state of New Jersey. New Jersey’s case
was argued in the Third Circuit just a day after the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Shelby County. At the oral argument, the
state’s lawyers, including former Solicitor General Theodore Olson,
placed heavy weight on Shelby County, sensing that its impact could
be momentous. But they seemed uncertain of just what to make of
13
it —as did the Third Circuit judges when they ultimately rejected the
14
state’s argument three months later. Because the Supreme Court’s
7. Gans, supra note 6.
8. Town Hall Debate: McConnell and Rosen on the Voting Rights Act, YAHOO NEWS
(June 25, 2013, 6:45 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/town-hall-debate-mcconnell-rosen-votingrights-act-184607340.html [http://perma.cc/ZJX2-JYN7].
9. Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling is About the Conservative
Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_supreme_court_and_the_voting_
rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html [http://perma.cc/JA46-KY62].
10. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
11. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012)). For a summary of PASPA and its exemptions,
see Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power,
91 VA. L. REV. 249, 250–52 (2005).
12. See NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
13. See Oral Argument, NCAA, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 13-1713, 13-1714 & 121715), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings (select “All Oral Argument Files”;
scroll down and select “13-1713, 13-1714 & 13-1715 NCAA et al. v. Gov. of N.J. et al.wma”).
14. See NCAA, 730 F.3d at 237–39.
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discussion of its new equal sovereignty principle had been so
surprisingly undeveloped, it was impossible to say just what the
principle meant or what application it should have, and the judges felt
obligated to confine it primarily to the narrow context of the Voting
15
Rights Act.
This Article contends that Shelby County’s critics are only half
right—and that the Shelby County majority, despite its cursory
analysis, is half right too. The critics are correct that the Court
seemingly pulled the equal sovereignty principle out of thin air—that
it played a little too fast and loose with precedent and failed to
16
wrestle adequately with constitutional text, structure, and history.
Nonetheless, this Article maintains that there is indeed a deep
structural principle of equal sovereignty that runs through the
Constitution. And, in fact, statutes like PASPA are constitutionally
17
questionable (though most of the federal statutes listed by Justice
Ginsburg and others as potentially imperiled are not). The Court’s
critics have therefore misdirected their fire. They would be better
advised to focus their criticism on the Shelby County Court’s
conclusion that there was no adequate justification for the Voting
Rights Act’s deviation from the principle of equal sovereignty—a
dubious proposition upon which I express no firm opinion here—
rather than on the Court’s conclusion that such a principle exists in
the first place. That is to say, there is a strong argument that the
Voting Rights Act should have survived the heightened scrutiny
triggered by its contravention of the principle of equal sovereignty.
But the notion that the Constitution does not contain such a principle
at all is misguided.
This Article seeks to articulate the constitutional argument—
conspicuously missing from the ipse dixit of Shelby County—in favor
of the equal sovereignty principle, and to begin to develop a
framework for its operation. At this point in time, as exemplified by

15. See id. at 239 (declaring that “there is nothing in Shelby County to indicate that the
equal sovereignty principle is meant to apply with the same force outside of the context of
‘sensitive areas of state and local policymaking’” (quoting Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624)).
16. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2136 (arguing that “the Court should not have
adopted the equal sovereignty doctrine with so little ventilation”).
17. In 2005, I published an article in the Virginia Law Review raising that very possibility.
See Colby, supra note 11. That article posited a relatively narrow doctrinal rule—that Congress
cannot discriminate between the states in its exercise of the commerce power. Id. This Article
comes at the issue from a different angle, exploring the more fundamental constitutional
principle of equal state sovereignty.
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the Third Circuit’s throw-its-hands-up-in-the-air decision in the
PASPA case, no one knows what the equal sovereignty principle
means, whether it is legitimately a part of our Constitution, where it
18
comes from, and what effect it has. This Article endeavors to defend,
develop, and explain the principle (as well as to sensibly cabin it), and
19
to start to answer those questions.
Part I summarizes and criticizes the Court’s inadequate
discussion of equal sovereignty in Shelby County and sets out a
superficially compelling case—grounded in precedent, text, and
history—against the equal sovereignty principle. Part II drills down
further into the sources of constitutional law to undermine that initial
case, constructing in its place a more compelling argument—again
grounded in precedent, text, and history (but this time more deeply),
and also in constitutional structure—in support of the principle of
equal sovereignty among the states. And finally, Part III briefly
sketches out what a better-grounded equal sovereignty principle
would look like in practice. Properly understood, the equal
sovereignty principle is not a guarantee of state equality in all
respects. It guarantees only equal sovereignty—equal capacity for
self-government—which makes it more fundamental, but much less
expansive, than Justice Ginsburg and other critics have feared.

18. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Affects Each of Us: The Supreme Court Term in
Review, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 369–70 (2013) (“What part of the Constitution did Section 4(b)
violate? What level of scrutiny was the Court using? What is the constitutional basis for the
principle of equal sovereignty? None of these questions was addressed by the Court.”); Katyal
& Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2134 (“The Court’s creation of the equal sovereignty
principle . . . raised many more questions than it answered. . . . Where does the equal
sovereignty principle come from? Is there a textual hook, or is it just an inference from
constitutional structure?”); id. at 2136 (noting that “federal courts will have to grapple with the
logic and limits of the equal sovereignty principle for a while”). Thus, for instance, a number of
public-interest groups and law professors filed an amicus curiae brief in King v. Burwell
speculating that it might conceivably violate the equal sovereignty principle to read the
Affordable Care Act to disallow federal subsidies in states that do not choose to operate their
own health insurance exchanges. See Brief of Amici Curiae Jewish Alliance for Law and Social
Action (JALSA) et al. in Support of Respondents at 12–35, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(2015) (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 350366. Part III of this Article suggests that it would not, insofar
as all states are afforded the same sovereign right to establish health insurance exchanges.
19. Shortly before the publication of this Article, I was made aware of another not-yetpublished article—written contemporaneously with this one, but only posted online after a draft
of this Article had been posted—that seeks to accomplish some of these same objectives, albeit
largely on different grounds. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby County’s Principle of
Equal State Sovereignty, 68 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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I. THE INADEQUACY OF SHELBY COUNTY AND THE SUPERFICIALLY
COMPELLING CASE AGAINST THE EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE
The Supreme Court first floated the idea that the Voting Rights
Act might run afoul of some principle of equal sovereignty among the
states in dicta in the 2009 case of Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
20
District Number One v. Holder, also authored by Chief Justice
Roberts. In that case, the Court flagged “serious” constitutional
questions surrounding the Voting Rights Act, but concluded that
21
those questions were not squarely raised by the facts of the case. The
entirety of the Court’s off-hand discussion of equal sovereignty in
Northwest Austin consisted of the following three-sentence
paragraph:
The [Voting Rights] Act also differentiates between the States,
despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy “equal
sovereignty.” United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960) (citing
Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845)); see also Texas
v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725–726 (1869). Distinctions can be justified in
some cases. “The doctrine of the equality of States . . . does not
bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”
[South Carolina v.] Katzenbach, [383 U.S. 301], at 328–329
[(1966)] (emphasis added). But a departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s
disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem
22
that it targets.

When the Court squarely confronted the constitutional issue four
years later in Shelby County, and directly concluded that the Voting
Rights Act’s coverage formula contravenes the constitutional
mandate of equal sovereignty, its discussion was no less compact and
offhand. Indeed, the Court relied on the above paragraph from
Northwest Austin as the core authority for its conclusion. Here is the
Court’s analysis of the existence of the equal sovereignty principle, in
full:
Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there
is also a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” among the
States. Northwest Austin, [557 U.S.], at 203 (emphasis added). Over
a hundred years ago, this Court explained that our Nation “was and
20. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
21. See id. at 204, 206–11.
22. Id. at 203 (alterations in original); see Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2134 (“The
Court’s creation of the equal sovereignty principle was as cursory as it was disruptive . . . .”).
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is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.” Coyle v.
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911). Indeed, “the constitutional equality
of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme
upon which the Republic was organized.” Id. at 580. Coyle
concerned the admission of new States, and Katzenbach rejected the
notion that the principle operated as a bar on differential treatment
outside that context. [Katzenbach,] 383 U.S., at 328–329. At the
same time, as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing
subsequent disparate treatment of States. [Northwest Austin,] 557
U.S., at 203.
23

The Voting Rights Act departs from these basic principles.

This breezy analysis—making fundamental constitutional law in
a few conclusory sentences—combined a troubling misuse of
precedent with a surprising failure to make any detailed attempt to
ground the equal sovereignty principle in either the Constitution’s
24
text or its history. This Part endeavors to demonstrate that—at first
glance, anyway—precedent, text, and history all appear to belie the
Court’s naked conclusion.
A. Precedent
The Northwest Austin Court’s quotation of South Carolina v.
25
Katzenbach comes across as practically Orwellian. In Katzenbach,
the Justices in fact rejected the argument that the Voting Rights Act
runs afoul of a doctrine of equality among the States, squarely
declaring that “that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which
26
States are admitted to the Union.” Yet the Northwest Austin Court
audaciously quoted that very sentence from Katzenbach as primary
support for its contrary argument, using an ellipsis to skip over the

23. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623–24 (2013) (citing parenthetical and parallel
citations omitted).
24. See generally Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24 (2013) (criticizing Northwest Austin along these lines and
anticipating and condemning the Court’s forthcoming move in Shelby County).
25. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
26. Id. at 328–29. The full sentence from Katzenbach reads as follows: “The doctrine of the
equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine
applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies
for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” Id.
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part of Katzenbach that renders reliance on that case untenable.
That is to say, the Court brazenly quoted Katzenbach “as support for
the idea that a ‘doctrine of the equality of the states’ exists—
concealing the part about how ‘that doctrine applies only to the terms
upon which the States are admitted to the Union’ behind a
28
strategically placed ellipsis.”
In Shelby County, the Court then took the apparent ruse one
step further. The Chief Justice begrudgingly acknowledged (for the
first time) that Katzenbach had actually limited the applicability of
the doctrine of state equality outside of the context of the admission
29
of new states. But he then relied on Northwest Austin for the
proposition that, nonetheless, “the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent
30
disparate treatment of the States.”
This amounted to a double sin. First, the Court tried to minimize
the meaning and scope of Katzenbach by declaring that Katzenbach
simply “rejected the notion that the [state-equality] principle
operated as a bar on differential treatment outside th[e] context” of
31
“the admission of new States.” But Katzenbach did not just say that
the state-equality doctrine fails to impose a categorical bar on all
differential treatment of the states outside of the context of admission
to the Union. It said that that doctrine has no effect at all outside of
that context—that it “applies only to the terms upon which States are
32
admitted to the Union.”
Second, having deceptively carved out of Katzenbach space for a
state-equality doctrine that might operate (short of a categorical bar)
outside of the context of the admission of new states, the Court
immediately declared that that space had already been filled by
Northwest Austin: “[A]s we made clear in Northwest Austin, the
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent
33
in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.” This sleight-

27. See Price, supra note 24, at 30–31 (“Note the ellipses and added emphasis. The quote in
[Northwest Austin] omits key phrases from Katzenbach, thereby reversing the implication of the
quoted passage.”).
28. Fishkin, supra note 6, at 177; see also Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2133.
29. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623–24 (2013) (“Katzenbach rejected the
notion that the principle operated as a bar on differential treatment outside that context.”).
30. Id. at 2624.
31. Id. at 2623–24.
32. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966).
33. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624.
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of-hand simply bootstrapped Northwest Austin’s blatant
mischaracterization of Katzenbach into a brand-new constitutional
34
rule. As Justice Ginsburg bemoaned in her dissent, “the Court
ratchet[ed] up what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing
breadth to the equal sovereignty principle in flat contradiction of
35
Katzenbach.” And it did so “with nary an explanation of why it finds
Katzenbach wrong, let alone any discussion of whether stare decisis
nonetheless counsels adherence to Katzenbach’s ruling on the limited
36
‘significance’ of the equal sovereignty principle.”
Aside from Katzenbach, which in fact had expressly limited the
state-equality doctrine to the admission of new states, and Northwest
Austin, which had patently misread Katzenbach, the Court in Shelby
County and Northwest Austin cited only a handful of other cases in
support of the equal sovereignty principle. But those cases—Coyle v.
37
38
39
Smith, United States v. Louisiana, and Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan —
which the Court did not analyze at all, were all decided under the
“equal footing doctrine”—the doctrine requiring equality for newly
40
admitted states.
In a recent article in the New York University Law Review
responding to Northwest Austin, Professor Zachary Price makes a
compelling argument that the equal footing doctrine is a narrow one
that covers new states only and provides no support whatsoever for a

34. This was an especially egregious sin, given that the Northwest Austin Court purported
not to reach the constitutional issue. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2134–35 (arguing
that by purporting only to flag, rather than decide, the issue in Northwest Austin, but then
relying on Northwest Austin as dispositive in Shelby County, “[t]he Court was . . . able to use the
avoidance canon to effect and then mask its major doctrinal transformation”).
35. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles
& Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481,
519–21 (2014).
36. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Town Hall Debate:
McConnell and Rosen on the Voting Rights Act, supra note 8 (remarks of Michael McConnell)
(“I do not believe the Court is rigidly required to comply with all precedent, but I do believe we
are entitled to explanation when it does not.”).
37. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
38. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
39. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
40. Actually, the Court cited one other case—Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725
(1869)—which has nothing explicit to say about state equality at all, holding only that the states
retain sovereignty under the Constitution and that the Southern states had not lawfully seceded
from the Union because our nation is “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States.” See Price, supra note 24, at 32 n.9. The possible relevance of White is discussed infra
note 353.
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broader principle of equal sovereignty among existing states. That
42
doctrine, explains Price, is concerned with a specific problem.
Because the admission of new states on equal terms with the existing
states would water down the power and influence of the existing
states in Congress, Congress (composed, of course, entirely of
representatives from the existing states) might be tempted to admit
new states on less favorable terms instead—giving itself more power
over those states than the Constitution gives it over the original
43
states. The equal footing doctrine simply precludes Congress from
44
doing so. In the Supreme Court’s words, it rejects “the contention
that any [new] State[s] may be deprived of any of the power
constitutionally possessed by other States, as States, by reason of the
terms in which the acts admitting them to the Union have been
45
framed.”
The equal footing doctrine provides that, whatever powers are
reserved to the states by the Constitution—whatever protections the
architecture of constitutional federalism provides to the states—those
powers and protections are the same for all states, regardless of when
46
they entered the Union. It is in this respect that new states enter the
Union on “equal footing” with existing states. But, argues Price, the
“equal footing principle says nothing about whether federal
legislation, validly enacted pursuant to Congress’s enumerated
powers, must treat states equally. Insofar as Congress could treat the
47
original states unequally, it can do the same to the new states . . . .”
And whether Congress could treat the original states unequally is
48
simply not the province of the equal footing doctrine. That doctrine
is about discrimination against new states, not about discrimination
among existing states. It does not speak to the issue of discrimination
among existing states.

41. See Price, supra note 24, at 32–39.
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id.
44. See id. (“[S]uch conditions are enforceable only if Congress could have imposed them
on an existing state.”).
45. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570 (1911).
46. Price, supra note 24, at 33–34.
47. Id. at 34.
48. See id. at 32 (“The equal footing doctrine . . . provides no support for a requirement of
equal treatment of states in federal legislation.”).
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Price then canvasses the Supreme Court’s equal footing cases to
49
elicit ample support for his conclusion. For instance, the Court’s
most important equal footing decision, Coyle v. Smith, held
unenforceable a provision in the federal statute admitting Oklahoma
to the Union that precluded the new state from moving its state
50
capital. That provision was invalid because Congress could not
51
impose a similar requirement on the existing states. Choosing where
to locate a state capital is an exclusive state prerogative—an incident
of state sovereignty—that lies beyond the power of the federal
52
government. Congress cannot use an admission statute to burden a
new state with a prohibition or obligation “in respect of matters
which would otherwise be exclusively within the sphere of state
53
power.” But the Coyle Court went on to explain that Congress
remains free to impose conditions in admission statutes that “are
within the scope of the conceded powers of Congress over the
54
subject.” If the Constitution provides that Congress can regulate in a
particular area, then Congress could interfere with the sovereignty of
the existing states in that area—in which case there is nothing unequal
about its interfering with the sovereignty of a new state in that area.
From this, Price concludes that the equal footing doctrine—the
only actual authority relied upon by the Northwest Austin and Shelby
County decisions to support the equal sovereignty principle—in fact
55
provides no support for that principle at all. The doctrine establishes
only that if Congress could not impose a burden on an existing state,
it cannot impose it on a new state. It has nothing whatsoever to say
about whether Congress can discriminate among the existing states.

49. See id. at 34–38.
50. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911).
51. See id. at 565 (“That one of the original thirteen States could now be shorn of [the
powers to locate and change its state capital] by an act of Congress would not be for a moment
entertained.”).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 568.
54. Id.; see also id. at 574:
It may well happen that Congress should embrace in an enactment introducing a new
State into the Union legislation intended as a regulation of commerce among the
States, or with Indian tribes situated within the limits of such new State, or
regulations touching the sole care and disposition of the public lands or reservations
therein, which might be upheld as legislation within the sphere of the plain power of
Congress.
55. See Price, supra note 24, at 38 (“In sum, the equal footing doctrine provides no support
for a general requirement that federal legislation treat states equally.”).
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B. Text
If the Court’s treatment of precedent in establishing the equal
sovereignty principle was rushed and seemingly less than completely
sincere, its treatment of the Constitution’s text was nonexistent.
Nowhere in the Court’s terse discussions of equal sovereignty in
Northwest Austin and Shelby County does it so much as mention a
single provision of the constitutional text.
That absence is, of course, damning on its own; if there were a
provision of the Constitution that actually supported the Court’s
holding, surely the Court would have cited it. But the omission may
be even more egregious than that. In fact, even a cursory examination
of the constitutional text—an examination that the Court
conspicuously did not perform—seems to reveal not only that there is
no explicit constitutional principle of state equality, but also that there
can be no such principle implicit in the Constitution either. That is to
say, the text is not just damning in its silence; it affirmatively cuts
against the Court’s conclusion.
Textually, the Constitution does explicitly mandate the equal
treatment of the states, but only in several particular respects. Under
the Tax Uniformity Clause, for instance, “all Duties, Imposts, and
Excises [imposed by Congress] shall be uniform throughout the
56
United States.” Likewise, the Naturalization and Bankruptcy
Clauses empower Congress to “establish [a] uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
57
throughout the United States.” And the Port Preference Clause
provides that “[n]o Preference shall be given by any Regulation of
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of
58
another.” The existence of these narrow and specific textual
demands for state equality strongly implies the absence of an
59
unwritten, general equality mandate. It would make little sense for a

56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
57. Id. cl. 4.
58. Id. § 9, cl. 6.
59. See Price, supra note 24, at 27 (“The text of the Constitution, moreover, implies the
absence of a general principle of state equality by mandating some forms of equal treatment but
not others.”); id. at 28 (arguing that “at least in the absence of some compelling reason to infer a
constitutional principle of state equality, the specificity of guarantees such as the Tax
Uniformity Clause and the Port Preference Clause suggests that no general rule otherwise
guards states against unequal treatment in federal legislation”); Town Hall Debate: McConnell
and Rosen on the Voting Rights, supra note 8 (remarks of Michael McConnell):
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Constitution that implicitly requires equality among the states across
the board to contain a handful of particular and limited explicit stateequality provisions.
C. History
The Court’s treatment of history resembled its treatment of
text—in that it, too, was nonexistent. And just as with the text, a
cursory examination of the history that the Court ignored seems quite
damning.
To begin with, even the narrow (and seemingly inapplicable, in
any event) equal footing doctrine is historically dubious. At the
Constitutional Convention, the Framers affirmatively rejected a
provision that would have required all new states to be admitted on
60
equal footing with the existing states. Although James Madison and
61
others supported that provision, it was removed from the
62
Constitution on the motion of Gouverneur Morris, who later
explained that his intention in striking the provision was to allow for
Congress, when admitting new states, “to govern them as provinces
63
and allow them no voice in our counsels.” So, in fact, the history
shows that the equal footing doctrine was intentionally left out of the
Constitution.
It is true that the equal footing doctrine nonetheless enjoys a
long historical pedigree in the sense that Congress (or the president)
More importantly, this “fundamental principle” is not to be found in the
constitutional text. There are specific provisions requiring equal treatment of states,
such as the one prohibiting any “Preference . . . by any Regulation of Commerce or
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another,” or the one stating that
bankruptcy laws must be “uniform”–or even the neglected requirement of the
Spending Clause that money may be expended only for the “general” welfare, as
opposed to the sort of local projects Congress now feels free to fund. But there is no
generalized equal protection clause for the states.
60. See 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 492 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 2d ed. 1891)
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (summarizing the debate over the motion to strike a proposed
clause providing that “the new states shall be admitted on the same terms as the original
states”).
61. See id. (“Mr. Madison opposed the motion; insisting that the Western States neither
would, nor ought to, submit to a union which degraded them from an equal rank with the other
states. . . . Mr. Sherman was against the motion, and for fixing an equality of privileges by the
Constitution.”).
62. See id. at 492–93.
63. William A. Dunning, Are the States Equal Under the Constitution?, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 425,
437 (1888) (quoting an 1803 letter from Morris); see also 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at
492 (“Mr. Langdon was in favor of the motion. He did not know but circumstances might arise
which would render it inconvenient to admit new states on terms of equality.”).

COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

IN DEFENSE OF EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY

2/21/2016 10:25 PM

1101

has always promised equality to the new states in their formal
64
admission resolutions, and the Supreme Court has formally
65
condoned the doctrine for well over a century. But it would seem
that peeling back the façade of this historical pedigree reveals nothing
of substance underneath. Actual historical practice, rather than the
empty formality of abstract legislative and judicial proclamations,
66
reveals routine discrimination against new states throughout history.
In the very same enactments in which it has always offered pro forma
promises of equal footing, Congress has explicitly imposed all sorts of
obligations on new states that it has not—and often could not—
impose on existing states: from bans on polygamy to mandates for
67
Prohibition, jury-trial rights, and open public schools. Congress may
have claimed to be admitting the new states on equal footing, but
what it actually did belies what it disingenuously said. In the words of
one historian who has exhaustively canvassed the historical record,
“[T]he history of the use of conditions [imposed by Congress on new
states]—used unequally against states that are perceived as different
or disloyal, in areas far removed from the enumerated federal
powers of Article I, and to subordinate states to an overarching
federal system—raises questions about the historical grounding for
68
the Court’s legal conclusions [about the equal footing doctrine].”

In addition, if we turn to history for insight on the real question
at issue—whether Congress can discriminate among existing states,
rather than against new states—we see a similar story. Congress has a
long track record of discriminating among the existing states in a wide
69
variety of respects. Congressional budgetary “earmarks” benefit
70
certain states, and not others. Congress uses its power over federal
property to benefit some states—by, for instance, establishing jobs-

64. See Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous History of a Constitutional
Principle, 18 PUBLIUS 53, 54–55 (1988).
65. See infra Part II.A.
66. See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 120 (2004) (“Of the thirtyseven states admitted to the Union since the adoption of the Constitution (plus the eleven
Southern states readmitted after the Civil War), almost all of them have had some sort of
condition imposed on them when they were admitted.”); Onuf, supra note 64, at 55 (“Yet new
states were not in fact equal to old states.”).
67. See Biber, supra note 66, at 130–31; Onuf, supra note 64, at 55; infra note 114.
68. Biber, supra note 66, at 124.
69. See Colby, supra note 11, at 327–34, 341–46; Price, supra note 24, at 28–29.
70. See Price, supra note 24, at 28.
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providing military bases—and to burden others—such as sticking
71
Nevada with most of the nation’s high-level nuclear waste. Congress
72
sets differing agricultural quotas for the various states. Congress
sometimes enacts pilot programs that operate only in some states, as a
73
means of testing particular federal initiatives. Congress has enacted
74
regulatory laws that apply in some states, but not others, has
75
exempted some states from certain federal regulatory obligations,
has “grandfathered” some states from certain federal regulatory
76
requirements, and has even allowed some states the leeway to enact
their own regulatory programs, while denying that leeway to other
77
states. In the words of one historian, “[t]he conclusion from all the
historical facts seems to be that at no time since the formation of the
present constitution have all the states of the Union been in the
78
enjoyment of equal powers under the laws of Congress.”
In sum, the history, like the text and the caselaw, seems not to
support the equal sovereignty principle at all.
II. THE CASE FOR THE EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE
The preceding Part sets out what, at first glance, seems to be a
potent—perhaps even devastating—argument against the equal
sovereignty principle: the Court’s new doctrine apparently lacks any
grounding in precedent, text, or history. But this Part digs deeper into
all three of those inquiries, with an emphasis on constitutional
structure as well. In so doing, it seeks to establish that there is, in fact,
something to the equal sovereignty principle—something substantial
and important. The lack of a clear textual mandate is far less
significant than it might first appear, and both the history and the
caselaw, along with the underlying structure of our constitutional
system, actually provide powerful support for a constitutional
79
commitment to equal sovereignty.
71. See Colby, supra note 11, at 334 n.305.
72. See id. at 346.
73. See Price, supra note 24, at 28 & n.23.
74. See Colby, supra note 11, at 346.
75. See id. at 341.
76. See id. at 341–42.
77. See id. at 343–45; Price, supra note 24, at 29.
78. Dunning, supra note 63, at 452.
79. Aside from its express support for some measure of structural reasoning, this Article is
intentionally agnostic as to the proper method of constitutional interpretation. What follows
will, I believe, establish that nearly all of the traditional modalities of constitutional argument,
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A. The Equal Footing Doctrine
Perhaps the best place to start is with the equal footing
doctrine—both because it touches directly on text, history, structure,
and precedent, and because it was the equal footing cases upon which
the Shelby County Court purported to rely. As noted above, it is true
that the equal footing doctrine has dubious originalist credentials,
insofar as the Framers chose not to include it within the constitutional
80
text. But we should be careful not to make too much of that
omission. Gouverneur Morris, who made the motion to strike the
provision, later explained that he, personally, was motivated by a
desire to admit future states on less compelling terms: “I always
thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would
be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in
81
our councils.” But Morris did not express that view clearly to his
fellow delegates, precisely because he did not think that they would
agree: “In wording the third section of the fourth article, I went so far
as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor
obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly
82
expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.” The most
that can be comfortably said about the framing history, then, is that
the Framers chose not to resolve the equal footing issue explicitly at
83
the Convention.
see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1982), cut in favor of the
existence of a flexible and sensibly cabined equal sovereignty principle. Thus, one need not take
sides in the interpretive debates to agree with the conclusions presented here.
80. See supra Part I.C.
81. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 404 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (1803 letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston).
82. Id.
83. See Valerie J.M. Brader, Congress’ Pet: Why the Clean Air Act’s Favoritism of
California Is Unconstitutional Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 119, 132 (2007) (“Even Morris admitted that many other founders would
not have agreed with his interpretation, and the debates make it clear that a contentious issue
was essentially resolved with compromise language that had as its chief asset room for
ambiguity.”). Admittedly, the Framers did, in one particular respect, textually preserve greater
sovereignty for old states than for new ones, at least temporarily. The ninth section of Article I
provides that the “Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
thousand eight hundred and eight.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.1 (emphasis added). This clause
“implicitly allowed Congress to ban transatlantic slave imports to new states even before 1808.”
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 275 (2005). This was as much
of a concession as the antislavery forces could obtain without scaring the deep Southern states
away from the Convention. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 452 (James Wilson in the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention):
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1. The Equal Footing Pedigree. The equal footing doctrine may
not have been explicitly woven into the constitutional text, but it
nonetheless has a long and unbroken statutory pedigree. At the very
same time that the Philadelphia Convention was punting on the issue
of equality for new states, the Continental Congress in New York was
84
crafting the Northwest Ordinance, which explicitly required that any
new states carved from the Northwest Territories must enter the
85
Union “on an equal footing” with the original states. Virtually every
admission statute in our nation’s history has followed the lead of the
86
Northwest Ordinance. Time and time again, new states have been

[I]t was all that could be obtained. I am sorry it was no more; but from this I think
there is reason to hope, that yet a few years, and it will be prohibited altogether; and
in the mean time, the new states which are to be formed will be under the control of
Congress in this particular, and slaves will never be introduced amongst them.
; id. at 115 (General William Heath in the Massachusetts ratifying convention) (“The federal
Convention went as far as they could. The migration or importation, &c., is confined to the
states now existing only; new states cannot claim it.”). As Professor Gillian Metzger has noted,
the inclusion of this “provision could signal either that the Framers accepted that new states
might have lesser powers, or (by operation of the expressio unius maxim) that in all other
regards the states were to be equal.” Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate
Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1518 n.210 (2007). Professor Akhil Amar argues in favor of
the latter interpretation:
True, the words “equal footing” did not appear [in the Constitution]. Yet this idea
shone through in the document’s general structure and in many of its specific rules.
Apart from [the 1808 Clause], the Constitution nowhere distinguished between the
original states and later ones. . . . Gouverneur Morris later bragged about how he had
successfully blocked a specific guarantee of equal footing; but regardless of the
outcome of this textual battle, Morris had lost the structural war. The original
thirteen states would have no privileged place within America’s New World order.
AMAR, supra, at 274–75.
84. See Jack N. Rakove, Ambiguous Achievement: The Northwest Ordinance, in
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS AND LEGACY 14–15
(Frederick D. Williams ed., 1988).
85. An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-West of the River Ohio,
art. V, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 n.a (1789) (incorporating the original Northwest Ordinance under the
newly ratified Constitution). The Northwest Ordinance was first enacted by the Continental
Congress. After the ratification of the Constitution, the first Congress voted to keep the
ordinance in effect under the new government. See Brader, supra note 83, at 133. (Although the
First and Second Continental Congress and the Congress of the Confederation were the
nation’s legislative bodies before the U.S. Constitution went into effect, this Article refers to
both of these legislatures as the Continental Congress to reduce confusion.)
86. See Onuf, supra note 64, at 54 (“[The Northwest Ordinance] was extended directly or
by implication to other territories. Every state was admitted—whether by act or joint resolution
of Congress or by presidential proclamation—with an express declaration of equality.”).
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explicitly “admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the
87
original States in all respects whatsoever.”
88
The equal footing doctrine has a long judicial pedigree as well.
89
The Supreme Court has recognized and enforced it since the 1830s.
Early on, the Court was unclear about whether the doctrine was
simply a statutory one—dictated by the new states’ admission
statutes—or whether it contained a constitutional component
90
(notwithstanding the Constitution’s textual silence on the matter).
But in 1845, the Court made clear that the doctrine is of
constitutional dimension. The Justices declared that a statutory
provision seeking to admit a new state on unequal terms—with an
unequal “municipal right of sovereignty”—would be “void and
91
inoperative.” Since then, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the
92
constitutional nature of the equal footing guarantee. As the Court
put it in 1857, “[c]learly Congress could exact of the new State the
surrender of no attribute inherent in her character as a sovereign
independent State, or indispensable to her equality with her sister
States, necessarily implied and guarant[e]ed by the very nature of the
93
Federal compact.”
Over the last 180 or so years, the Court has applied the equal
footing doctrine in a number of contexts, many of which touch
directly on the mandate of equal sovereignty among states. In
94
Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, for instance, the

87. E.g., An Act to Enable the People of Wisconsin Territory to Form a Constitution and
State Government, and for the Admission of Such State Into the Union, ch. 89, 9 Stat. 56, 56
(1846).
88. See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987) (“The equal
footing doctrine is deeply rooted in history . . . .”).
89. See Brader, supra note 83, at 136–37 (discussing the early cases).
90. See Price, supra note 24, at 33 n.48 (citing Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S.
(9 Pet.) 224, 235–36 (1835)).
91. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845); see also Mayor of Mobile
v. Eslava, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234, 258–59 (1842) (Catron, J., concurring) (stating that new states
have “equal capacities of self-government with the old states, and equal benefits under the
constitution of the United States”).
92. See, e.g., Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896) (“[T]he language of the act
admitting Wyoming into the Union, which recognized her coequal rights, was merely
declaratory of the general rule.”); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892) (“[T]he
equality prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated.”); Escanaba & Lake
Mich. Trans. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688–89 (1883) (“[Illinois] was admitted, and
could be admitted, only on the same footing with [the original states].” (emphasis added)).
93. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 93 (1857).
94. Permoli v. Mun. No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).

COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1106

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2016 10:25 PM

[Vol. 65:1087

Court rejected the notion that Congress could force Louisiana to
protect religious liberty rights. Although prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment “[t]he Constitution [made] no provision for protecting
the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties,”
Louisiana’s enabling act—the federal statute allowing it to become a
state—required it to protect religious freedom as a condition of
95
statehood. The Court held that the enabling act had no effect once
Louisiana was admitted to the Union. Congress could require the
state to include a particular provision in the state constitution as a
condition of admission—because until that point, Louisiana was just a
territory without equal sovereignty rights—but once Louisiana gained
admission to the Union, Congress lost control over the contents of its
96
law and its state constitution. Louisiana was free to amend its
constitution to remove a provision whose inclusion Congress had
previously mandated as a condition of statehood.
97
Similarly, in Coyle v. Smith, discussed briefly above, the Court
held unconstitutional Congress’s attempt to limit Oklahoma’s ability
to move its state capital. Oklahoma’s enabling act of 1906 required
98
the new state to keep its capital in Guthrie at least until 1913. But in
1910, the state legislature enacted a law to move the capital to
99
Oklahoma City. The Supreme Court held that the state was free to
do so, notwithstanding the contrary provision in its enabling act. “The
power to locate its own seat of government and to determine when
and how it shall be changed from one place to another . . . are
100
essentially and peculiarly state powers.” The notion that “one of the
original thirteen States could now be shorn of such powers by an act
101
of Congress would not be for a moment entertained.” Because a
new state cannot “be placed upon a plane of inequality with its sister
States in the Union,” the restriction in the enabling act was
102
unconstitutional.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 609.
See id. at 610.
See supra Part I.A.
See Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, § 2, 34 Stat. 267, 268–69 (1906).
See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1911).
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id.
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2. Equal Footing and Congressional Power. These and other
cases emphasize that the equal footing doctrine mandates that
Congress cannot impose a burden on a new state, in the state’s
enabling act, that it would not be able to impose upon an existing
state. A corollary of that proposition, however, is that if the burden
imposed by the enabling act is one that Congress could also impose
on an original state—because it falls within the scope of a power
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution—then
Congress does not violate the Constitution by imposing it on the new
103
state. This is a point that the cases have emphasized as well.
This could suggest one of two things. First, it could suggest that
the states have a residual degree of sovereignty protected by the
enumerated-powers doctrine and recognized by the Tenth
104
Amendment. What the equal footing doctrine does is simply
establish that new states have that same residuum of sovereignty. So
whenever Congress is acting within a legitimate sphere of federal
power, rather than in a sphere exclusively reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment, the equal footing doctrine does not come into
play at all. As such, that doctrine does not tell us anything about

103. See, e.g., id. at 573:
[W]hen a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers
of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States, and . . . such
powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired or shorn away by any
conditions, compacts or stipulations embraced in the act under which the new State
came into the Union, which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of
congressional legislation after admission.
; see also id. at 574 (“It may well happen that Congress should embrace in an enactment
introducing a new State into the Union legislation intended as a regulation of commerce among
the States . . . which might be upheld as legislation within the sphere of the plain power of
Congress.”); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845):
By the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution, power is granted to Congress
“to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states.” If, in the
exercise of this power, Congress can impose the same restrictions upon the original
states, in relation to their navigable waters, as are imposed, by this article of the
compact, on the state of Alabama, then this article is a mere regulation of commerce
among the several states, according to the Constitution, and, therefore, as binding on
the other states as Alabama.
In United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), the Court upheld a provision of the New
Mexico enabling act that prohibited introducing alcohol into Indian country on the ground that
the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, as well
as an unenumerated power to “exercis[e] a fostering care and protection over all dependent
Indian communities,” id. at 45–46, and “[b]eing a legitimate exercise of that power, the
legislation in question does not . . . disturb the principle of equality among the States,” id. at 49.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
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whether Congress can discriminate (in terms of respecting
sovereignty) between the states in the course of exercising its
legitimate powers; if Congress could discriminate among the original
states, then it can discriminate among the new ones too. Whether
Congress could or could not discriminate among the existing states
when legislating within its legitimate spheres of influence is a question
utterly distinct from, and completely unaffected by, the equal footing
doctrine. Equal footing is about discrimination against new states
105
only. This is Professor Price’s view.
These cases could also mean something different, however. The
statements about how burdens imposed on new states are valid if they
could have been enacted pursuant to a legitimate federal power might
mean simply that the equal footing doctrine does not grant new states
any greater protection from federal regulation—any greater degree of
sovereignty—than the Constitution gives to the original states. In
other words, they might simply be an expression of equal sovereignty.
At no point do these cases come out and say that Congress is free to
enact discriminatory, unequal burdens on the sovereignty of the new
states, so long as it is exercising a legitimate federal power. Rather,
the cases might be suggesting that Congress could not do so. The
cases could be saying that Congress cannot admit a new state without
making it the sovereign equal of the other states, not simply because
of a narrow equality principle governing the admission of new states,
but rather because of a broad, generalized principle of equal state
sovereignty. On this view, the equal footing doctrine is just a
particular, concrete aspect of a broader and deeper principle. No
state, new or old, can have more or less sovereignty than the other
states. New states are admitted into the Union on these terms, with
the understanding that they, just like the existing states, will now and
always be on equal footing and have equal sovereignty with all of the
other states. And that means that Congress cannot, even when

105. See supra Part I.A. It is also Justice Ginsburg’s. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for its “unprecedented
extension of the equal sovereignty principle outside its proper domain—the admission of new
States”). Going one step further, one could read these cases not to be irrelevant to the question
of Congress’s ability to discriminate among existing states in exercising its legitimate powers,
but instead to affirmatively support the view that Congress can do so. See Greenbaum et al.,
supra note 6, at 848 (reading Coyle to say that “Congress can enact laws affecting states
differently at admission where its powers would allow it to do so in any event,” and declaring
that, “[i]mplicit in this, of course, is the notion that Congress may enact legislation that affects
different states differently”).
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exercising one of its legitimate powers, enact legislation that treats
any of the states (new or old) as unequal sovereigns.
It is true that the equal footing cases all involve the admission of
new states, because those are the circumstances in which Congress is
most tempted to try to make second-class citizens of particular states.
And those are the circumstances in which Congress is most able to do
so—when the states being discriminated against do not yet have
representation in the Congress doing the discriminating. But that
does not mean that the true nature of the principle at play is
necessarily the narrower concept, rather than the broader one.
Indeed, when we stop to think about it, the broader concept
seems far more intuitive. To say that the new states must be admitted
on equal footing with the old states would seem to imply, almost by
necessity, that the old states are already on equal footing with each
106
other. What else could it mean? If new states must be on equal
footing with old states, but old states are not on equal footing with
each other, then to require that new states be admitted on equal
footing with old states is to say that new states need not be on equal
footing with the other states—which would be gibberish.
In addition, Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention
summarizing the discussion that led to the decision not to include the
equal footing doctrine explicitly in the constitutional text make it
plainly evident that the Framers were assuming that the original
107
states were all on equal footing. The issue was simply whether to

106. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 77 (1960) (noting that the “concept of equal
footing” involves the “political sovereignty guaranteed equally to all States”); Pollard’s Lessee,
44 U.S. at 224 (noting that “the municipal sovereignty of the new states will be complete,
throughout their respective borders, and they, and the original states, will be upon an equal
footing, in all respects whatever”); cf. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 104 (1997) (“[Under the Northwest Ordinance,] the
new states were to be admitted ‘on an equal footing’ with the old; there would be no second-class
members of the Union. Vital as it was to harmonious relations, the equal footing doctrine was
later found implicit in the Philadelphia Constitution; the Ordinance was its source and its
inspiration.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
107. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 288 (1992) (noting that, even if the
Framers did not agree on whether new states needed to be admitted on equal footing, “there is
no evidence that any of the [original] thirteen were to be less than equal”); see also 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 469 (1825 letter from
William Steele to Jonathan Steele recounting the words of Jonathan Dayton, Convention
delegate from New Jersey) (explaining that when the Convention initially resolved to have
proportional representation in the Senate, the small-state delegates met and issued an
ultimatum to the Convention that, if that decision were not overturned, “and the smaller states
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extend that same privilege to new states. Madison, who opposed the
motion to strike the equal footing language, explained that no states
“would, nor ought to, submit to a union which degraded them from
108
an equal rank with the other states.” Hugh Williamson, who
supported the motion, disagreed on the merits, but explicitly shared
the underlying assumption: “Mr. Williamson was for leaving the
legislature free. The existing small states enjoy an equality now, and
for that reason are admitted to it in the Senate. This reason is not
109
applicable to new Western States.”
Once we accept—as I think we must—that the equal footing
doctrine exists, has long been understood to be of constitutional
dimension, and implicitly necessitates the proposition that all states
are on equal footing, then the only way to avoid the fundamental
constitutional principle of equal sovereignty among the states is to say
that, although all states (old and new) are on equal footing, that does
not mean that they enjoy equal sovereignty—that equal footing
entails some form of state equality that is distinct from, and somehow
less than, equal sovereignty. But that is simply not consistent with
historical practice. The equal footing doctrine has always been
understood to include—indeed, to consist primarily of—a guarantee
of equal sovereignty. The mandate has always been for the new states
to be admitted “upon an equal footing with the 13 Original States,
having the same rights of freedom, sovereignty, and Independence as
110
the said States.” The Supreme Court has routinely reiterated that
111
equal footing is about an equal “municipal right of sovereignty” —
112
“equal capacities of self-government.” In short, as the Supreme
Court has made clear, “[t]he ‘equal footing’ [doctrine] has long been
113
held to refer to political rights and to sovereignty.”

put upon an equal footing with the largest,” the small-state delegates would walk out of the
Convention).
108. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 492.
109. Id. (emphasis omitted).
110. 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 249 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934) (May 10, 1786) (reporting the work of the committee tasked with
developing a plan for governing the western territories).
111. Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 223.
112. Mayor of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234, 259 (1842) (Catron, J., concurring)
(“This is the extent of the guarantee.”); see also Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911)
(declaring that “when a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of the
powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States”).
113. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950).
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So then we are left only with the possibility that even though all
states are on equal footing, and thus must have equal sovereignty,
that principle is nonetheless not offended by acts of Congress that
discriminate between states by affording some states greater
sovereignty than others, so long as Congress is acting pursuant to one
of its legitimate powers. This is the most charitable interpretation of
the narrow view of the equal footing cases. It reads those cases in dual
sovereignty, Tenth Amendment terms to say only that the basic
federal–state balance is the same for the new states as it is for the old
states. Congress cannot regulate or limit the sovereignty of the new
states except in areas in which it is constitutionally empowered to act
vis-à-vis all of the states. It is in this limited respect that the new states
possess the same degree of sovereignty as do the original states; since
Congress cannot limit New York or Virginia’s ability to move its state
capital, it cannot limit Oklahoma’s ability either. But when Congress
exercises one of its legitimate powers—acts within one of its
legitimate spheres—it is free to afford more sovereignty to Oklahoma
or New York than it affords to Virginia. If Congress could burden all
of the states, then it can burden only some of them, or just one of
them.
But the fundamental problem with this narrow conception of the
equal footing doctrine—that it guarantees new states the same
sovereignty as the original states in the limited sense of confining
Congress to the same pool of powers to act over them, but has
nothing to say about whether Congress can discriminate between
states (old or new) in exercising its legitimate constitutional powers—
is that it seems ultimately pointless. Why would we care whether the
new states are on equal footing with the old states if Congress is free
to discriminate among any and all states? If Congress is already free
to discriminate against whatever states it wants, then telling the new
states that they are on equal footing with the old states does not really
help them; it does not protect them from discrimination. And in that
case, the doctrine seems irrelevant.
To be fair, this is overstating the point. The narrow view of the
equal footing doctrine does not render the doctrine entirely
irrelevant. Confining Congress only to its lawful powers when it seeks
to regulate new states undoubtedly affords important protections to
those states. And this was especially true before the New Deal, when
the sphere of legitimate federal authority was understood to be
substantially smaller than it is today. Many of the permanent
limitations that Congress attempted to impose upon new states over
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the years were in fact unconstitutional under even the narrow
understanding of equal footing—from limitations on polygamy and
alcohol consumption, to English language mandates, to requirements
for religious toleration and open public schools—because Congress
was, at the time, not considered to have any authority in those
114
areas. But, according to the narrow view, when Congress is
legislating pursuant to a legitimate federal power, equal footing does
not come into play, and discrimination is perfectly constitutional. The
Constitution does not guarantee equal sovereignty to the states.
3. Equal Footing Is Grounded in Equal Sovereignty. But that is
not what the Supreme Court seems to have had in mind in the equal
footing cases. That is not what it seems to have meant when it noted
that conditions imposed on new states would be valid if they could be
imposed pursuant to a legitimate federal power. Although the facts
and holdings of the equal footing cases are generally consistent with

114. See Biber, supra note 66, at 130–31 (listing conditions imposed by Congress). Most of
these limitations never gave rise to litigation. But some did, and were struck down. See, e.g.,
Coyle, 221 U.S. at 568 (striking down Congress’s attempt to preclude Oklahoma from moving its
state capital); Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 87–89 (1900) (upholding a provision of the
Nebraska Constitution that permitted prosecution of felonies on the basis of information,
despite a provision in the state’s enabling act that arguably required the use of grand juries);
Permoli v. Mun. No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609–10 (1845) (holding that it
would violate the equal footing doctrine for Congress to mandate that Louisiana must protect
religious liberties after statehood); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1985)
(discussing Coyle and assuming arguendo that Congress’s attempt to permanently preclude
Utah from adopting polygamy was unconstitutional, but noting that Utah has never sought to
introduce polygamy since becoming a state); Williams v. Hert, 110 F. 166, 169 (C.C.D. Ind.
1901) (holding that an attempt by Congress in a new state’s enabling act to guarantee criminal
procedure rights in the state’s courts that must “forever remain unalterable” violates the equal
footing doctrine). The fact that Congress imposed so many of these conditions, while
simultaneously paying lip service to the equal footing guarantee, should not be taken as
evidence that such conditions are constitutional, especially given the fact that judges slapped
them down when the conditions were tested in court. It should be viewed, instead, as evidence
that the members of those Congresses, “like other politicians, could raise constitutional ideals
one day and turn their backs on them the next.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 626 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring). Keith Whittington explains,
Such decisions did not stop Congress from using its statehood enabling acts (and
comparable bills) to make declarations about what the future states could “never” do,
but it was now widely understood as it had not been before that such declarations had
no legal force. They were symbolic and hortatory. The courts would not enforce the
supremacy of federal law in such cases.
Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1315
(2009). In any event, since the critics of the equal sovereignty principle accept the equal footing
doctrine (at least when narrowly construed), and seek only to confine it to the admission of new
states, the existence of these conditions on new state admissions undermines their interpretation
as much as it undermines mine.
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either view of the doctrine, the reasoning and rhetoric of the cases
clearly express the broader view: Congress is obligated to respect a
core constitutional principle that all states are entitled to equal
sovereignty.
Take Coyle v. Smith. In explaining the equal footing doctrine, the
Coyle Court noted that there is no express equality requirement in
the provision of Article IV that provides that “‘new States may be
115
admitted by the Congress into this Union.’” “But what is this
116
power?” asked the Court. “It is not to admit political organizations
which are less or greater, or different in dignity or power, from those
117
political entities which constitute the Union.” To the contrary,
118
“[t]he power is to admit ‘new States into this Union.’” “‘This
Union,’” the Court explained, “was and is a union of States, equal in
119
power, dignity and authority.” The Court continued, “To maintain
otherwise would be to say that the Union, through the power of
Congress to admit new States, might come to be a union of States
120
unequal in power.” And that would violate the Constitution, which
contemplates—indeed necessitates—a union of equal sovereigns.
Thus, Congress may not “by the imposition of conditions in an
enabling act, deprive a new State of any of those attributes essential
121
to its equality in dignity and power with other States.”
In other words, the Court was saying that the equal footing
doctrine is not just an unmoored doctrine about the permissible terms
of admission for new states. It is instead a specific manifestation of a
general principle of state sovereign equality that is “necessarily
implied and guarant[e]ed by the very nature of the Federal
122
compact.” As one federal court put it in the late nineteenth century,
“[t]he doctrine that new states must be admitted . . . on an ‘equal
footing’ with the old ones does not rest on any express provision of
the constitution . . . but on what is considered . . . to be the general

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Coyle, 221 U.S. at 566 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 568, 570.
Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 93 (1857).
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character and purpose of the union of the states . . . —a union of
123
political equals.”

Or, in the Supreme Court’s words, the “perfect equality” of all
“members of the Confederacy” with regard to their “attributes
as . . . independent sovereign Government[s]” “follow[s] from the
very nature and objects of the Confederacy, [and] from the language
124
of the Constitution.” As such, the equal sovereignty principle, upon
which the equal footing doctrine is based, is not limited to the
admission of new states. Rather, “[e]quality of constitutional right
and power is the condition of all the States of the Union, old and
125
new.” “There can be no distinction between the several States of
the Union in the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty and
dominion which they may possess and exercise over persons and
126
subjects within their respective limits.”
The cases are thus expressly grounded in the broad view of the
equal footing doctrine, not the narrow one. They articulate an
understanding of the equal footing doctrine that is premised on—and
127
necessitates the existence of—the equal sovereignty principle. They
stand for the proposition that Congress, regardless of the power that
it seeks to exercise, is constrained to respect the constitutionally
mandated sovereign equality of all of the states.
And it is this broad view that better accords with the structure of
constitutional federalism. The narrow view seems to be implicitly (if
unintentionally) premised on an unduly cramped understanding of
the nature of state sovereignty in our federal system. It seems to
assume that state sovereignty exists only in those areas protected by
the Tenth Amendment—only in those spheres in which the federal
government is disempowered from acting. If that were true, then
limiting the federal government to its legitimate spheres when
admitting new states would be sufficient to vindicate the lofty vision
of equal state sovereignty forcefully advanced in the equal footing
cases.

123. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (C.C.D. Or. 1889).
124. Withers, 61 U.S. at 92.
125. Escanaba & Lake Mich. Trans. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1882).
126. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892).
127. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012) (noting, essentially, that
“the basis for the equal footing doctrine” is the “principle” that all of “the States in the Union
are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution”).
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But it is not the case that the states are sovereign only in the
areas in which they possess exclusive sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment. There are, instead, many areas in which the states and
128
As
the federal government possess concurrent sovereignty.
Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, because “the
plan of the Convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation,
the State Governments . . . clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had and which were not . . . exclusively delegated to
129
the United States.” “The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in
certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power,”
130
Hamilton expounded. Thus, “the rule that all authorities, of which
the States are not explicitly divested in favour of the Union, remain
with them in full vigour, is not only a theoretical consequence of that
division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the . . .
131
constitution.”
132
Of course, the Supremacy Clause gives Congress the greater,
ultimate authority in those areas of concurrent sovereignty, in the
sense that Congress gets the final word. But the states retain genuine
133
sovereignty within those spheres nonetheless. And so, federal laws
in those areas implicate and infringe state sovereignty, even though
134
they do not generally violate the Constitution. Thus, for instance,

128. See, e.g., Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 727 (1865) (noting that
sometimes “the power to regulate commerce may be exercised by the States”); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819) (“That the power of taxation is one of vital
importance; that it is retained by the States; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar
power to the government of the Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two
governments: are truths which have never been denied.”).
129. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
130. Id. at 203.
131. Id.
132. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
133. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[U]nder our federal system, the States
possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669–70
(1981) (“It has long been recognized that, ‘in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress,
there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it.’”
(quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945))).
134. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981)
(“Although such congressional enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the States’ prerogatives
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the Supreme Court has long employed a presumption against
preemption that is explicitly grounded in respect for the
constitutionally significant sovereignty of the states in areas of
135
concurrent authority. As the Court has noted,
because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system,
we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly
in those in which Congress has “legislated in a field which the States
have traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
136
Congress.”

Once we appreciate that federalism recognizes and respects state
sovereignty even in areas in which Congress is empowered to act, it
becomes clear that, in order to vindicate the passionate assertion in
the equal footing cases that “[t]here can be no distinction between the
several States of the Union in the character of the jurisdiction,
sovereignty and dominion which they may possess and exercise over
137
persons and subjects within their respective limits,” Congress
cannot be allowed to use its legitimate powers in a way that affords
more sovereign authority to some states than to others. In the words
of the Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century,
[T]he whole Federal system is based upon the fundamental principle
of the equality of the States under the Constitution. The idea that
one State is debarred [by Congress], while the others are granted,
the privilege of amending their organic laws to conform to the
wishes of their inhabitants, is so repugnant to the theory of their
138
equality under the Constitution that it cannot be entertained.

to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider important, the
Supremacy Clause permits no other result.”).
135. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 533 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting the
“principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that underlie the Court’s reluctance
to find pre-emption”).
136. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also id. (“That approach is consistent
with . . . federalism concerns . . . .”).
137. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892).
138. Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 89 (1900).
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4. Equal Footing Even When Congress Is Exercising a Legitimate
Federal Power. Perhaps there are those who doubt—despite the
unambiguous rhetoric—that the Court in the equal footing cases was
really employing the broader conception of state sovereign equality.
To placate those doubters, we would presumably need an equal
footing case involving a situation in which Congress discriminated
against a new state in an area of concurrent authority, where
Congress is generally empowered to act with regard to all states. In
other words, we would need a situation in which Congress limited the
sovereignty of a new state, but did not do so for the other states, even
though it could, if it so desired, have done so for all of the states
through the exercise of one of its legitimate powers. A situation like
that would squarely tee up the question whether the equal footing
doctrine gets at a deeper principle of state sovereign equality, or just
establishes that the dual sovereignty system and the Tenth
Amendment apply to new states. But those situations were few and
far between in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—the time
period in which the Union was expanding and the Court was deciding
the major equal footing cases—because the scope of legitimate
federal power was understood to be much more limited then.
Consider the hot-button question of whether it was
unconstitutional for Congress to admit new states on the condition
that those states permanently ban slavery. In 1819 and 1820, during
the build-up to the Missouri Compromise, Congress fiercely debated
imposing such a condition on Missouri. That prospect raised equal
footing concerns because “if Missouri was required to renounce
slavery it would be deprived of the right to resolve the issue for itself
as other states could; it would not have the same sovereign rights that
139
other states enjoyed.” Those congressional debates recognized that
there could be no reasonable objection to conditioning admission to
the Union on the new state’s compliance with a mandate that
140
Congress had the independent constitutional authority to impose.
But the question whether Congress, in exercising its legitimate
powers, has the constitutional authority to impose a sovereigntycurtailing mandate on a new state without also imposing it on the
other states was not presented, because it was generally understood at

139. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801–
1829, at 243 (2001).
140. See id. at 238; id. at 239 (“Everyone seemed to agree that what Congress could
prescribe by ordinary legislation it could make a condition of statehood.”).
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that time that Congress’s legitimate powers were not expansive
141
enough to encompass abolishing slavery in the states at all. Thus,
even on the narrow conception of equal footing, imposing such a
142
condition on Missouri would have been unconstitutional.
But, as it happens, there is a line of equal footing cases that
provides substantial insight—those involving the free navigation of
143
waterways. The Supreme Court has held since the days of John
Marshall—that is to say, even before judicial recognition of the equal
footing doctrine—that the power to regulate intrastate navigable
waters that connect to the interstate waterway system is a concurrent
144
power, shared by the federal government and the states. Rivers
“constitute navigable waters of the United States . . . when they form
in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be
145
carried on with other States or foreign countries.” Both the states
and the Congress have the sovereign authority to regulate those
waterways, but in the event of conflicting regulations, the federal law
146
will trump pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.

141. See, e.g., Declaration of the Anti-Slavery Convention (Dec. 4, 1833), in PROCEEDINGS
ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA, DEC. 1833, at 15 (New
York, Door & Butterfield 1833) (“We fully and unanimously recognize the sovereignty of each
State, to legislate exclusively on the subject of slavery which is tolerated within its limits; we
concede that Congress, under the present national compact, has no right to interfere with any of
the slave States, in relation to this momentous subject.”); Paul Finkelman, Lincoln,
Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional Change, 9 SUP. CT. REV. 349, 354 (2008) (“In
1860 a claim of federal power to end slavery in the states was simply unthinkable for someone
like Lincoln, who took law and constitutionalism seriously.”).
142. See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 93–94 (1850); CURRIE, supra note 139, at
244–45; Onuf, supra note 64, at 62 & n.19. But see John C. Eastman, Re-evaluating the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 123, 129–33 (2003) (advocating an even narrower
conception of equal footing based on the fact that the Northwest Ordinance purported to
permanently ban slavery from new states while at the same time guaranteeing their admission
on equal footing).
143. See Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S. 288, 293 (1887); Cardwell v.
Am. River Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 208 (1885); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Trans. Co. v. City of
Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688 (1883); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 88–89 (1857); Huse
v. Glover, 15 F. 292, 293 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883) (Harlan, J.).
144. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (Marshall,
C.J.).
145. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
146. See Willson, 27 U.S. at 252; see also Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
713, 729 (1865) (“The States have always exercised this power, and from the nature and objects
of the two systems of government they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in
all cases, to the paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the States shall be
exerted within the sphere of the commercial power which belongs to the nation.”).
OF THE
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In Escanaba & Lake Michigan Trans. Co. v. City of Chicago,
the Supreme Court heard a case filed by a company that operated
steamships in interstate commerce on Lake Michigan and various
connecting waterways. The City of Chicago, acting under a grant of
authority from the State of Illinois, constructed several drawbridges
over the Chicago River. The plaintiff shipping company sought to
compel the City to take down those bridges, as their frequent closings
148
impeded shipping along the river. The company noted that the Acts
of Congress enabling the creation of and admitting the State of
Illinois mandated that the navigable waters of the new state, including
149
the Chicago River, “shall be common highways and forever free.”
Thus, argued the company, the bridges were erected in violation of
150
federal law.
In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court began by
observing that the “Chicago River and its branches must . . . be
deemed navigable waters of the United States, over which Congress
151
under its commercial power may exercise control.” But, at the same
time, “the States have full power to regulate within their limits
matters of internal police,” which “power embraces the construction
152
of . . . bridges.”
Invoking the Supremacy Clause, the Court
explained that “[i]f the power of the State and that of the Federal
government come in conflict, the latter must control and the former
153
yield.” “But until Congress acts on the subject, the power of the
154
State over bridges across its navigable streams is plenary.”
The Court then considered and dismissed the shipping
company’s argument that Congress had acted on the subject—by
requiring in the state’s enabling act that navigation of the Chicago
155
River be “forever free.” The Court held that that limitation “could
not control the authority and powers of the State after her
admission,” because “[o]n her admission she at once became entitled

147. Escanaba & Lake Mich. Trans. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1883).
148. Id. at 679.
149. Id. at 688 (quoting the Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1789)).
150. Id. at 682.
151. Id. at 683.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (noting that this doctrine was approved by Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (2
Wall.) 713, 729 (1865), and Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252
(1829)).
155. Id. at 688.
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to and possessed of all the rights of dominion and sovereignty which
belonged to the original States. She was admitted, and could be
156
admitted, only on the same footing with them.” The power to
regulate navigable waters within the state’s boundaries—although
subject to the superior authority of Congress—was nonetheless within
157
the “inherent sovereignty” of the state. It was within Congress’s
power to regulate navigable rivers, but Congress could not use that
power to grant Illinois less sovereign authority to regulate her rivers
158
than other states have to regulate theirs.
Here we have a situation in which Congress imposed a condition
on a newly admitted state that it could have—but did not—impose on
the existing states pursuant to one of its enumerated powers (in this
case, the commerce power). And yet the Court still invoked the equal
footing doctrine and still struck the condition down. Not on the
ground that all limitations on a state in its enabling act have no effect
after statehood; to the contrary, this line of cases recognizes the
aforementioned principle that a limitation imposed in an enabling act
remains in effect if it can be justified as a valid exercise of Congress’s
159
legitimate powers.
But this provision, by denying the equal
sovereignty of the states, was not a valid exercise of Congress’s
160
commerce power.
156. Id. at 688–89. The Court went on to hold in the alternative that, in any event, the acts of
the City of Chicago did not contravene the language of the state’s enabling act. See id. at 689–91.
157. Brief for Appellee at 3, 10, Escanaba, 107 U.S. 678 (No. 1057) (quoting Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324, 338 (1876)).
158. See Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 689 (“Equality of constitutional right and power is the
condition of all the States of the Union, old and new. Illinois, therefore, . . . could . . . exercise
the same power over rivers within her limits that Delaware exercised over Black Bird Creek,
and Pennsylvania over the Schuylkill River.”).
159. See Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 120–21 (1921) (noting that
“so far as [the Northwest Ordinance] established public rights of highway in navigable waters
capable of bearing commerce from State to State, it did not regulate internal affairs alone, and
was no more capable of repeal by one of the States than any other regulation of interstate
commerce enacted by the Congress”); Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 9–10
(1888) (“In admitting some of the new States, [a free navigation clause] has been inserted in the
law . . . ; and it has been supposed that in this new form of enactment it might be regarded as a
regulation of commerce, which Congress has the right to impose.”).
The first case that Escanaba cited for the proposition that Illinois must be able to
exercise the same power over rivers within her limits as Delaware and Pennsylvania may
exercise over their rivers was Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, in which the Court had explained that
provisions in state enabling acts restricting the state’s authority over navigable waters are
constitutional if they are valid exercises of the commerce power. See Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 689
(citing Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845)).
160. See Econ. Light, 256 U.S. at 121 (noting that Congress generally has the power to
regulate navigable waters, and observing that the rules governing navigable rivers set down in
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This line of cases emphasizes that the power of a state to regulate
the navigable waters within its boundaries is one of its “necessary
161
attributes as an independent sovereign Government.” Thus, when
infringing this attribute of state sovereignty, Congress cannot “inhibit
or diminish [a state’s] perfect equality with the other members of the
162
Confederacy.” “[A]mong the incidents of that equality, is the right
to make improvements in the rivers, water-courses, and highways,
163
situated within the State.” The Court later explained that the
“principle which underlies [this branch of] the equal footing
doctrine . . . is that navigable waters uniquely implicate [state]
164
sovereign interests” —notwithstanding the fact that Congress is also
empowered to regulate those waters (and indeed, its regulations take
165
precedence).
This indicates that the equal footing doctrine is not just a
principle that establishes that new states, like the original states, are
sovereign in those spheres in which the Constitution does not
empower the Congress to act. The doctrine does not just provide that
the Tenth Amendment applies to new states as much as it does to the
old states. It also establishes that, even when Congress operates
within its legitimate spheres of authority, it cannot limit or remove
the sovereignty of some states, but not others. Congress can
effectively remove the sovereignty of all states over their navigable
166
waters through preemption. And it can override a state’s decision to
the Northwest Ordinance and the state enabling acts that were struck down in the Escanaba line
of cases would have remained in effect after statehood and would have trumped contrary state
laws if they had been valid exercises of the commerce power).
161. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 92 (1857).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 93.
164. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997).
165. Cf. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (“[W]hen the
Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters . . . subject only to the rights since
surrendered by the constitution to the general government.”); Palmer v. Cuyahoga Cty., 18 F.
Cas. 1026, 1027 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 10,688) (“A state, by virtue of its sovereignty may
exercise certain rights over its navigable waters, subject, however, to the paramount power in
congress to regulate commerce among the several states.”).
166. See Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 121 (1921) (upholding,
under Escanaba, a federal law regulating all of the navigable waters of the United States); Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 365, 366 (1897) (recognizing the power “of Congress to
deprive the several States of all authority to control and regulate any and every structure over
all navigable streams”); Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 731 (1865)
(“[Congress] may regulate all bridges over navigable waters . . . .”); Navigable Waters—Power
of a State and of the U.S.—Bridges, 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 101 (1891).
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allow, or not allow, a particular bridge in a particular location. What
Congress cannot do is what it allegedly tried to do to Illinois: preclude
only one state (or several states) from building any bridges—
168
categorically, statewide—while allowing other states to do so. That
167. See Cardwell v. Am. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 209 (1885) (“When Congress acts
directly with reference to the bridges authorized by the State, its will must control so far as may
be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams.”); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Trans. Co.
v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 687–88 (1883) (noting that while state and local authorities can
decide whether to erect bridges over navigable streams located entirely in one state, “Congress
[has] the power at all times to interfere and supersede their authority whenever they act
arbitrarily and to the injury of commerce”). It is true that such a regulation of commerce would
apply in only one state, not nationwide, and would limit that state’s sovereignty in the minimal
sense that the state would no longer be able to make a decision about whether or not to place a
bridge at that particular location. But the Constitution limits the sovereignty of all fifty states to
that same minimal degree, by empowering Congress to have the final say on all of these
individual, one-off, localized matters. See Dunning, supra note 63, at 443 (“[I]t is idle to seek for
inequality among the states in this particular. Congress controls the Hudson and the
Susquehanna to precisely the same extent that it does the Missouri and the Arkansas.”).
168. This principle comes through most clearly when examining the cases that immediately
followed Escanaba—Cardwell and Willamette—which involved provisions in the admission acts
of California and Oregon, respectively, that were materially identical to the one struck down in
Escanaba. Prior to the Supreme Court’s Escanaba decision, the lower court in Hatch had held
that the Oregon admission-act provision was a controlling congressional regulation of
commerce that precluded the state from constructing bridges over navigable rivers. See Hatch v.
Wallamet Iron Bridge Co., 6 F. 326, 337–38 (C.C.D. Or. 1881).
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Escanaba, another lower court in the same
circuit was asked to rule in Cardwell on the identical California admission-act provision. The
court noted that the case was “clearly within the rule as laid down” in Hatch, and considered
whether Escanaba effectively “overrules the principle announced” in Hatch. Cardwell v. Am.
River Bridge Co., 19 F. 562, 562 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884). The judge noted that “there is language in
the [Escanaba] opinion that favors that view,” and he was “by no means certain” whether the
Supreme Court “intend[ed] to go as far as its broadest language indicates.” Id. The judge
further explained that his own view was that the California admission act was a valid regulation
of commerce, and that Escanaba could perhaps be distinguished on the ground that the Illinois
admission act had not directly guaranteed free navigation in the same way that the California
act did (but rather had simply cross-referenced the Northwest Ordinance, which was held to be
no longer valid after statehood). See id. at 563–65. The judge did “not understand it to be held,
or intimated,” in Escanaba “that Congress cannot, by legislation in the interest of interstate
commerce, take control of any one, or all, of the navigable waters, either of Illinois, Delaware,
or Pennsylvania. Only it has not yet done so.” Id. at 565. Indeed, he said, his own view was that
Congress “might take control, generally, of all the navigable waters of any particular state,
without reference to the waters of other states,” without “affect[ing] the ‘constitutional right or
power,’ or the equality, of the states.” Id. Still, in light of the broad language to the contrary in
Escanaba, he decided to treat Escanaba as binding, but urged the Supreme Court to distinguish
it on appeal. See id. at 566–67.
Shortly thereafter, the lower court in Hatch was asked to reconsider its ruling in light of
Escanaba. In that instance, the judge flat-out rejected what he considered to be dicta in
Escanaba, and “respectfully submit[ted]” that the free navigation provision in the Northwest
Ordinance “was a valid commercial regulation” and was “still in force in Illinois.” Wallamet
Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 19 F. 347, 359 (C.C.D. Or. 1884). In any event, he concluded,
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would eviscerate Illinois’s core sovereignty—“her powers as a
government”—in an impermissibly discriminatory manner, depriving
169
her of equal sovereignty with her peers.
This principle is not just about new states. It is about all states. It
is about the nature of statehood and the nature of the Union. On this
point, the Escanaba Court was quite clear: “Equality of constitutional
right and power is the condition of all the States of the Union, old and
170
new.”

Escanaba could be distinguished on the same grounds suggested by the circuit court in Cardwell.
See id. at 351 (rejecting as “without a shadow of foundation in either reason or authority” the
argument that “if Congress has the power to regulate the navigation of the Wallamet river, as a
navigable water of the United States, it cannot do so by a special act . . . applicable alone to the
waters of Oregon, but only by a general law, which shall operate uniformly upon all such waters
in the United States”). This argument could not possibly be true, said the judge, because
Congress has often regulated specific bridges or rivers. See id. at 351–52.
Both cases were then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court decided Cardwell
first. Counsel for the bridge company explained that, of course, Congress can regulate specific
bridges or rivers. But the broad provision in the California admission act did “not [just] say such
and such a stream . . . may be bridged.” Brief and Points of the Appellee at 10, Cardwell v. Am.
River Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205 (1885) (No. 855).
On the contrary, it [was] a general and sweeping prohibition of all such regulation by
the State, and an assumption by Congress of the sole and exclusive right with respect
to California, to initiate and enact laws of a class which, in the States generally, may
be enacted by their respective Legislatures, and enforced until Congress steps in and
supersedes the action of the State.
Id. Escanaba and Withers, argued counsel, squarely held that this “would have the effect of
depriving the State of its equal rights under the Constitution.” Id. at 11. The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that Escanaba was directly controlling and could not be distinguished, and that
the state admission act therefore violated the equal footing doctrine. See Cardwell, 113 U.S. at
211–12.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Cardwell, counsel for the appellant in Hatch, in
lieu of crafting an argument in his brief, chose simply to rely on the Cardwell decision as “so far
a controlling authority in this, that it is not deemed either necessary or proper to take the time
of the Court in discussing it.” Statement at 12, Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1
(1888) (No. 80). The Court indeed reversed, but did not discuss the issue, instead deciding on
the different ground (offered as an alternative ground in many of the prior cases, e.g., supra note
156) that it was immaterial whether or not the admitting-act provision remained in effect
because, properly construed, that provision did not apply to bridges and other physical
obstructions, but rather prohibited only tolls and duties. See Willamette, 125 U.S. at 9–12.
169. Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 688; cf. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
421, 433, 435 (1855) (acknowledging that federally erected bridges in one state can end up
diverting traffic to other states and, indeed, that “[t]here are many acts of congress passed in the
exercise of this power to regulate commerce” that end up “operat[ing] to the prejudice of the
ports in a neighboring State”—such as the “improvement of rivers and harbors” and “the
erection of light-houses”—but explaining that those acts do not run afoul of the Port Preference
Clause, because “what is forbidden is, not discrimination between individual ports within the
same or different States, but discrimination between States”).
170. Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 689.
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Thus, as future-Justice Sotomayor recognized in her law-review
note, the “equal footing doctrine ultimately rests on concepts of
171
federalism: the United States is a ‘union of political equals.’” It is
true that the doctrine itself applies by its terms only to the admission
of new states. But it is a doctrinal reflection of a broader
constitutional mandate. It is not just a shallow, freestanding precept
covering only the admission of new states, but rather a specific
manifestation of a deep, fundamental, and general principle that “the
Constitution guarantees sovereign equality to the states”—all of
172
them. Put differently, the equal footing doctrine itself may be a
narrow rule about the particular terms on which new members can be
admitted to the club, but it is grounded in and dependent upon a
broader understanding of the very nature of the club itself. The equal
footing cases are clearly and explicitly premised on the notion that
equal sovereignty among all states is inherent in the very notion of
our union of states. Indeed, the Supreme Court closed its opinion in
Coyle v. Smith—the leading equal footing case—with this
observation: “[T]he constitutional equality of the States is essential to
the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic
was organized. When that equality disappears we may remain a free
173
people, but the Union will not be the Union of the Constitution.”
As such, South Carolina v. Katzenbach was technically correct in
asserting that the “doctrine of the equality of States” that was
established in Coyle and the other equal footing cases—that is to say,
the equal footing doctrine—doctrinally “applies only to the terms
upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies
174
for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” But the explicit
171. Sonia Sotomayor, Note, Statehood and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case for Puerto
Rican Seabed Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 825, 835 (1979) (quoting Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732
(C.C.D. Or. 1889)).
172. Id. at 839.
173. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
174. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966) (citing Coyle, 221 U.S. 559).
Katzenbach may have meant to declare that not only the equal footing doctrine, but also the
entire notion of equal sovereignty, applies only to the admission of new states. See id. (“The
doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for
that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union . . . .”
(emphasis added)). In its brief, South Carolina invoked a broad principle of equal sovereignty.
See Brief of the Plaintiff at 13–15, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (No. 22).
If Katzenbach did indeed declare that broader principle to be limited to new states only, “that
declaration was,” in Professor Laurence Tribe’s words, “a quite gratuitous dictum,” 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-13, at 915 n.17 (3d ed. 2000)—
one that I believe to have been mistaken. Indeed, if that is what the Katzenbach Court was
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rationale behind the equal footing cases was broader. And for that
reason, those cases indicate that Justice Ginsburg was mistaken in
declaring in her Shelby County dissent that the “proper domain” of
the “equal sovereignty principle” is limited only to “the admission of
175
new States.”
B. Additional Precedent and History
The Court did not pull this vision of equal sovereignty—of which
the equal footing doctrine is only a particular manifestation—out of
thin air, either in Shelby County or in the earlier equal footing cases
just discussed. Rather, as Professor Gillian Metzger has recognized,
this notion was “[l]ong a staple of nineteenth-century political
176
discourse.” On the Senate floor in 1820, for instance, Senator
William Pinkney of Maryland forcefully argued that the “Union”
established by the Constitution is a “confederation of States equal in
sovereignty. . . . It is an equal Union between parties equally
177
sovereign.” Four years later, Representative John Holmes of
Massachusetts echoed that
saying, then it was every bit as guilty as the Shelby County Court of ruling by naked fiat, in
disregard of precedent, history, and constitutional structure.
175. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
176. Metzger, supra note 83, at 1517.
177. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 397 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney); see also, e.g., 34 ANNALS
OF CONG. 1230 (1819) (statement of Rep. McLane) (“It is of the very essence of our
Government, that all the States composing the Union should have equal sovereignty. It is the
great principle on which the Union reposes—the germ of its duration.”); Letter from President
James Monroe to Spencer Roane (Feb. 15, 1820), in DANIEL C. GILMAN, JAMES MONROE 149
(1898) (“[A]ll the states composing our Union, new as well as the old, must have equal rights,
ceding to the general government an equal share of power, and retaining to themselves the
like . . . .” (emphasis added)); James K. Polk, Harbours and Rivers, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 81, 93
(2004) (reproducing a draft veto message prepared by President Polk in 1848, which declared
that “[t]he equality of the States, as separate communities and distinct sovereignties, is one of
the corner stones of our political fabric”). In the nineteenth century, members of Congress
frequently articulated the argument, later picked up by the Supreme Court in the equal footing
cases just discussed, that Article IV’s provision for admitting “new States” into “this Union”
implicitly guarantees equal footing, because, in this country, the “States” all have the same
sovereign power, and to allow otherwise would create a different union from “this Union.” See,
e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 639 (1870) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“The States
which formed this Union were coequal States. . . . Congress has authority to admit new States
into the Union. Into what Union? A Union of coequal States. There is no authority to admit
States into any other Union. . . . You have a different Union if you have a Union of unequal
States.”); 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 321 (1820) (statement of Sen. Barbour); id. at 397 (1820)
(statement of Sen. Pinkney) (arguing that if a new state is admitted with less sovereignty than
the others, “it is not into the original Union that it comes. For it is a different sort of Union. The
first was a Union inter pares: This is a Union between disparates, between giants and a dwarf,
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[t]he original States, which formed the Constitution, were equally
sovereign and independent. Each gave up an equal portion of power
to the United States, and consequently what was retained must be
equal. Equality of power is essential to the existence of a State. It
cannot have less than the rest, and when it has, it ceases to be a
State. Nothing is so essential to the harmony and perpetuity of the
178
Union as this equality.

And the equal sovereignty principle has a long judicial pedigree
as well—even apart from the equal footing cases. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized “the structure of our Nation as a union of
179
States, each possessing equal sovereign powers.” “One cardinal
rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that of
equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with all the
180
rest.” It has long been a “standard federalism axiom that all states
181
are equal in value as quasi-sovereigns.”
between power and feebleness, between full proportioned sovereignties and a miserable image
of power”); id. at 1080–81 (1820) (statement of Rep. Hardin) (“[W]hat is meant by the word
Union? Is it not the . . .agreement between the States . . . which is called the Constitution? . . . If
Congress makes Missouri surrender any portion of her sovereignty that was not surrendered by
the old States, how can she be a party to the original agreement . . . ?”); CURRIE, supra note
139, at 243.
178. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 547 (1824) (statement of Rep. Holmes).
179. Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
455 U.S. 691, 704 (1982).
180. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting that the law of personal jurisdiction is based in part
on the states’ “status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system”); Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295
U.S. 455, 462 (1935) (noting the “rule that the States stand on an equal level or plane under our
constitutional system”); Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F. Cas. 939, 943 (C.C.D. Ohio 1838) (No.
13,245) (“[T]he states are equal. Equal in rank, equal in their powers of sovereignty . . . .”);
United States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 647, 656 (C.C.D.C. 1833) (No. 16,711) (noting “the
principle of equality among sovereign states”); Viet D. Dinh, First Impressions: A Tribute to
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 3, 3–4 (1997) (declaring that “the
United States remains a sovereign union of equally sovereign states” (quoting Sandra Day
O’Connor, Federalism: Problems and Prospects of a Constitutional Value, Speech to the
Woodrow Wilson Center (June 11, 1992))).
181. David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
507, 512–13 (2008). I would be remiss in ignoring the possibility that support for the equal
sovereignty principle might also be found in the deplorable antiprecedent of Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See generally James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last:
Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 39 (2014). But I do not believe that the Dred Scott case should be thought of as “the
origin” of the equal sovereignty principle—the principle’s origins in fact long predate Dred
Scott—or that a possible connection to Dred Scott necessarily taints the principle with a
uniquely “racially discriminatory pedigree.” Id. at 39, 42. To begin with, as Akhil Amar has
explained, Dred Scott was a “preposterous ruling” based on an “extravagant anticongressional
theory of state equality.” Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and thus of Section 5,
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This axiom was born of history. There was an “attention to
general Equality that governed the deliberations of [the
182
A pervasive theme in those
Constitutional] Convention.”
deliberations was the obsession, on the part of some of the Framers,
with equal sovereignty—an obsession that comes through most
clearly in the Convention’s most fundamental and drawn-out debates:
those concerning the question whether representation in the Congress
183
should be proportional to population or equal for each state. As
every school child learns, the large states demanded proportional
representation, whereas the small states insisted on equal
representation. The impasse nearly derailed the Convention, before
agreement was ultimately reached on the Connecticut Compromise,

126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109, 118 (2013) (explaining the convoluted theory); see also Alfred L.
Brophy, Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon the Constitution: Federal-State Relations in Scott
v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 204–05, 208–11 (1990) (detailing Chief Justice Taney’s
state-equality theory in Dred Scott, and tracing its origins to radical antebellum Southern
constitutional theory). Dred Scott was not actually grounded in the principle of equal
sovereignty that is defended in this Article. What is more, the entire notion of American
federalism has always—from the framing, through the Civil War and Jim Crow, right up to the
present day—been heavily entwined with slavery and racism. See Guy-Uriel Charles, Dissent,
Diversity, and Democracy: Heather Gerken and the Contingent Imperative of Minority Rule, 48
TULSA L. REV. 493, 502 (2013) (“[I]t is high time for federalism scholars to confront and
conquer federalism’s racist history. Race is the big African elephant in the room that federalism
scholarship and doctrine have essentially tried to ignore.”). Virtually every federalism doctrine
and principle can trace its origins in substantial part to efforts by the Southern states to
perpetuate slavery and racial injustice. Equal sovereignty is admittedly no exception; much of
the rhetoric in its favor in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was directly tied up with
reprehensible Southern efforts to avoid federally imposed racial justice. As Senator Sumner
once said, “Equality of States on the lips of slave-masters was natural, for it was a plausible
defense against the approaches of Freedom.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3025 (1868)
(statement of Sen. Sumner). But the equal sovereignty principle was neither uniquely nor
exclusively born of racist purposes. The possible similarities between Shelby County and Dred
Scott are important factors to consider in evaluating whether the Shelby County Court
misapplied the equal sovereignty principle (as Dred Scott surely did, to the extent that it was
invoking that principle at all), but they do not, in my view, discredit the existence of the
principle itself.
182. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 149
(remarks of Convention delegate James McHenry to the Maryland House of Delegates).
183. See Michael J. Teter, Equality Among Equals: Is the Senate Cloture Rule
Unconstitutional?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 574 (2010) (“The delegates who supported state
parity in the Senate believed that the new national government represented the states, not
individuals, and that . . . those states required an ‘equality of voices.’ The underlying fear . . . was
that proportional representation in the upper chamber would erode the equal sovereignty each
state possessed.” (footnotes omitted)).
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granting proportional representation in the House of Representatives
184
and equal representation in the Senate.
Throughout that long drama, the notion of equal sovereignty
consistently held center stage. Indeed, as Madison once noted, even
before the framing of the Constitution—back when the terms of the
Articles of Confederation were still being hammered out—the
founding generation faced a difficult challenge in trying to determine
an appropriate “rule of suffrage among parties unequal in size, but
185
equal in sovereignty.” That remark reveals an important truth. The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention vehemently disagreed
about which form of representation was more fair and appropriate,
but they did not disagree as to the antecedent assumption that the
states were to possess equal sovereignty. As Gunning Bedford of
Delaware put it at the Convention, “That all the states at present are
equally sovereign and independent, has been asserted from every
186
quarter of this house.”
The small-state delegates—those who insisted upon equal
representation—were most vocal. In the words of William Patterson
of New Jersey, the primary architect of the New Jersey Plan, which
centered around equal representation, “[a] confederacy supposes
sovereignty in the members composing it, and sovereignty supposes
187
equality.” Patterson noted that “it cannot be denied that all the
188
states stand on the footing of equal sovereignty.” Indeed, he was of
the view that the very notion of state sovereignty necessarily entails a
principle of equal state sovereignty: “If the sovereignty of the states is
to be maintained, . . . we have no power to vary the idea of equal
189
sovereignty.”
To Patterson, proportional representation was
squarely inconsistent with that principle. He wrote that “every State
in the Union as a State possesses an equal Right to, and Share of,
Sovereignty,” but proportional representation would mean that

184. See id. For an argument that this traditional story may fail to fully capture the true
nature of the compromise, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1357–67 (2001).
185. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 542
(undated preface to Madison’s notes from the Convention).
186. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 471.
187. 5 id. at 176.
188. Id. at 194.
189. Id.
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“some of the States of the Union will possess a greater Share of
190
Sovereignty . . . than others.”
The colorful Luther Martin of Maryland agreed “that an equal
191
vote in each state” was an essential “right of sovereignty.” He gave
a ponderous oration to the Convention seeking to establish “that the
states, like individuals, were, in a state of nature; equally sovereign
192
and free.” As Madison recounted it,
[i]n order to prove that individuals in a state of nature are equally
free and independent, [Martin] read passages from Locke, Vattel,
Lord Somers, Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with states,
till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in
193
Locke, and Vattel, and also Rutherford.

Returning then to the issue of proportional representation, Martin
insisted “that the states, being equal, cannot treat or confederate so as
194
to give up an equality of votes, without giving up their liberty.” He
held steadfast to the view that proportional representation was a
nonstarter, because “no modifications whatever could reconcile the
195
smaller states to the least diminution of their equal sovereignty.”
The supporters of proportional representation did not share the
small-state representatives’ obsession with equal sovereignty. Indeed,
many of them did not share an obsession with state sovereignty at all.
Rufus King of Massachusetts, for instance, argued that the states
already did not “possess the peculiar features of sovereignty”; “[t]hey
196
could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties.” And

190. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 613
(Patterson’s notes on his New Jersey Plan).
191. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 248.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 248–49.
195. Id. at 270; see also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 81, at 491 (statement of Mr. Bedford) (“[The states] must continue if not perfectly, yet
equally soverign [sic],” because “an inequality of power will . . . result from an inequality of
votes. Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole history of mankind
proves it.”); Notes of Rufus King in the Federal Convention of 1787, THE AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/king.asp [http://perma.cc/25CZ-FB57] (Rufus King’s
notes from the Convention, summarizing the remarks of Charles Pinkney of South Carolina)
(“If Representatives be apportioned among the States in the Ratio of numbers . . . the States
will be unequal, and their sovereignty will be degraded.”).
196. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 323
(statement of Mr. King); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 65 (1996).
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Hamilton took the position that the states should be abolished
altogether, or at least relegated to the status of “subordinate
197
198
jurisdictions.” Madison’s stance was, in effect, not much different.
In their view, sovereignty rested always with the people—not
with the states or the federal government. The people chose to grant
certain sovereign powers to each of those governments, but the states
199
were never the locus of the sovereignty itself. And it was not the
rights of the states that mattered; it was the rights of the people. As
James Wilson put it, “Can we forget for whom we are forming a
Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called
States? . . . We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed
200
of.” The goal of the Convention was to ensure “that every man in
America was secured in all his rights,” and it would be foolish “to
201
sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of State sovereignty.”
Still, the large-state delegates did not disagree that whatever
sovereign powers and prerogatives the states possessed, they
possessed them equally, and would continue to do so under the

197. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 323
(statement of Mr. Hamilton).
198. See RAKOVE, supra note 196, at 169 (“Only by abolishing the states altogether could
Madison have moved to alter the structure of the Union more radically.”). Even at the turn of
the nineteenth century, many Federalists still hoped to do away with state sovereignty
altogether. See PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE
LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 1776–1814, at 179–80 (1993) (“[Federalists]
questioned . . . that—even in the absence of European interference—the union itself could
survive unless those egregious baubles of sovereignty, those pestiferous incitements to
demagogy, the State Governments were more adequately controlled, if not abolished.” (citation
and quotation marks omitted)).
199. See ONUF & ONUF, supra note 198, at 85–86, 131; RAKOVE, supra note 196, at 190
(discussing the writings of James Wilson). In this regard, the Framers may not really have
viewed themselves as “split[ting] the atom of sovereignty.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 483; see
also id. at 199 (statement of Mr. Franklin) (“The Interest of a State is made up of the interests
of its individual members. If they are not injured, the State is not injured.”); RAKOVE, supra
note 196, at 67. Madison elaborated in the Federalist Papers,
Was . . . the American revolution effected, . . . was the precious blood of thousands
spilt . . . not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety; but
that the Governments of the individual States . . . might enjoy a certain extent of
power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? . . . [A]s
far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the
people, the voice of every good citizen must be, let the former be sacrificed to the
latter.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 129, at 309 (James Madison).
201. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 489
(statement of Mr. King).
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Constitution. They disagreed instead with the insistence that equal
representation was necessary for equal sovereignty. So long as each
state ceded the same authority to the federal government, the states
would retain equal sovereignty, regardless of the measure of
representation. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, for instance,
expressed the view “that, if any political truth could be grounded on
mathematical demonstration, it was, that if the states were equally
sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that
203
they would remain equally sovereign.” Similarly, Madison asserted
that it is fallacious to argue “from the equality of the sovereign states”
that any compact that they enter into—even one “by which an
authority was created paramount to the parties, and making laws for
the government of them”—must necessarily afford them equal voting
204
rights. To the same effect is Federalist 22, in which Hamilton labeled
as “[s]ophistry” and “logical legerdemain” the argument that a “right
of equal suffrage” necessarily follows from the principle “that
205
sovereigns are equal.” Indeed, since the people, not the states, are
the true locus of sovereignty, the large-state delegates felt that
concerns for equality counseled against giving equal representation to
206
states with very unequal populations.
The ultimate compromise may not have been entirely pleasing to
anyone—compromises rarely are—but it effectuated both visions of
equal sovereignty, one for each congressional chamber. The idea was
that, in Madison’s words, “[t]he Senate will represent the States in
their political capacity, the other House will represent the people of

202. See, e.g., Letter of James Madison to Unknown (Mar. 1836), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 607, 608 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910):
It is well known that the equality of the States in the Federal Senate was a
compromise between the larger, & the smaller states, the former claiming a
proportional representation in both branches of the Legislature, as due to their
superior population; the latter, an equality in both, as a safeguard to the reserved
sovereignty of the States, an object which obtained the concurrence of members from
the larger States.
(emphasis added).
203. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 250.
204. Id.
205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 138–39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
206. See, e.g., 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 258 (statement of Alexander
Hamilton) (“But as states are a collection of individual men, which ought we to respect most,
the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the
composition? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the
latter.”).
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the States in their individual capacity.” In each case, equal
sovereignty prevailed; just as the people were to have equal
208
sovereignty in their individual capacity, “the States in their political
capacity” were to be equally sovereign. Writing as “Fabius” during
the ratification debates, Federalist John Dickinson, a Convention
delegate from Delaware, explained that “[i]n the senate the
sovereignties of the several states will be equally represented; in the
house of representatives, the people of the whole union will be
209
equally represented.” Those who felt that equal representation was
necessary for equal state sovereignty got their wish with the Senate;
those who felt that equal state sovereignty would be preserved by
federalism even with proportional representation (which would better
respect the equality of the people) got their wish with the House. In
any case, as Madison explained at the Virginia ratifying convention,
the Constitution—compromises and all—created “a government of a
210
federal nature, consisting of many coequal sovereignties.”
C. Text and Structure
Now, at last, we come to the constitutional text. It is true that
there is no clause in the Constitution that explicitly articulates an
equal sovereignty principle. But we must be careful not to assign too

207. 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, at 499 (James Morton Smith ed., 1st ed. 1995)
(Oct. 24, 1787, letter from Madison to Jefferson); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13
(1964) (“‘[I]n one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the other, the States.’” (quoting
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 462 (remarks of
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut))); Max Farrand, Popular Election of Senators, 2 YALE
REV. 234, 239 (1913) (“There was undoubtedly a feeling in the Convention that . . . the lower
house represented the people of the States in their individual capacity, while the Senate
represented the States in their political capacity.”).
208. Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471–72 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (“[A]t the
Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the
country . . . . [T]he citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the
sovereignty.”).
209. 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 180,
182 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (emphasis omitted).
210. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 381; see also Letter of James Madison to
Spencer Roane (June 29, 1821), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
1816–1828, at 222, 223 (1865) (arguing that, without Supreme Court review of state court
judgments, “the State governments would not stand all in the same relation to the General
Government, some retaining more, others less, of sovereignty, and the vital principle of
equality, which cements their Union, thus gradually be deprived of its virtue”).
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much weight to that fact. When it comes to fundamental principles
of constitutional federalism, a lack of specific textual support is
actually par for the course. As Professor John Manning has noted,
“[i]n recent years, the Supreme Court has embraced a freestanding
federalism that is not tied to any particular clause of the
212
Constitution.” Consider, as a particularly striking example, Printz v.
213
United States, in which the Court looked to history, structure, and
precedent to find a constitutional limit on federal power despite its
open admission that there was “no constitutional text speaking to
214
th[e] precise question.” This is by no means an entirely recent
phenomenon, either. The Court has been enforcing federalism
principles lacking a clear textual foundation ever since Chief Justice

211. To be sure, the textual argument against the equal sovereignty principle is not simply
that the principle finds no explicit basis in the constitutional text. It is that the text affirmatively
cuts against an equal sovereignty doctrine, insofar as the Constitution enumerates a number of
narrow and specific guarantees of state equality, thus implying the absence of a broad and
general guarantee. See supra Part I.B. But this argument is less compelling than it might first
appear. For one thing, as I have sought to demonstrate in great detail elsewhere, the fact that
the Constitution explicitly requires Congress to legislate uniformly among the states only
pursuant to some powers, but not others (including, in particular, the uniquely significant
commerce power), is more of an accident of drafting history than a conscious choice on the part
of the Framers or a significant structural feature of the Constitution. See Colby, supra note 11,
at 266–88. More importantly, this argument miscomprehends the nature of the equal
sovereignty principle. As discussed infra Part III, the equal sovereignty principle is not a
generalized principle of state equality in all respects, or a generalized mandate that Congress
must treat the states equally in every regard—thus rendering the specific constitutional
guarantees of certain forms of uniformity and state equality redundant. Rather, it guarantees
only a specific kind of state equality—equal sovereignty—that is conceptually and functionally
distinct from the enumerated equality norms.
212. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2004 (2009); see also John F. Manning, Foreword: The
Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4, 31–32 (2014) [hereinafter Manning,
Foreword].
213. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
214. Id. at 905; see also, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (“This separate and
distinct structural principle is not directly related to the scope of the judicial power established
by Article III, but inheres in the system of federalism established by the Constitution.”);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996):
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, we have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition . . . which it confirms[:] . . . first, that each State is a sovereign entity in
our federal system; and second, that [i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to
be amendable to the suit of an individual without its consent.
(citations omitted).
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Marshall’s iconic decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, if not before
216
that. Recall Marshall’s colorful words from McCulloch: “There is no
express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a
principle which so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed
with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so
blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it,
217
without rending it into shreds.”
This method of interpretation was best described and defended
by Professor Charles Black nearly a half-century ago. Black argued in
favor of sometimes determining constitutional meaning not from
specific text, but rather from “the method of inference from the
218
structures and relationships created by the constitution.” The Court,
he said, should at times rely on reasoning “sounding in the structure
of federal union, and in the relation of federal to state governments,”
219
even when it “can point to no particular text as its authority.” Black
noted that, although this genre of reasoning is often rejected or
ignored in our legal culture, it has carried great weight in some areas
of constitutional law—federalism in particular, as exemplified by
220
McCulloch. Black explained that the Court’s reasoning in that case
on the question whether Maryland could tax the Bank of the United
States was “essentially structural,” relying on “the warranted
relational properties between the national government and the
government of the states, with the structural corollaries of national
supremacy—and, at one point, of the mode of formation of the
221
Union.”
Here was the heart of Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in
McCulloch:
This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in
pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution
215. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425–37 (1819) (holding, despite the
lack of explicit constitutional text, that states may not tax an instrumentality of the federal
government).
216. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. F. 98, 102–03 (2009) (explaining that before McCulloch, “several justices [on the
Court] invoked constitutional purposes and general arguments about the nature of state
sovereignty” in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
217. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 426 (emphasis added).
218. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
7–8 (1969).
219. Id. at 11.
220. See id. at 13–15.
221. Id. at 15.
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and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled by them.
From this, which may be almost termed an axiom, other
propositions are deduced as corollaries, on the truth or error of
which, and on their application to this case, the cause has been
supposed to depend. These are, 1st. that a power to create implies a
power to preserve. 2nd. That a power to destroy, if wielded by a
different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with these powers to
create and to preserve. 3d. That where this repugnancy exists, that
authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over
222
which it is supreme.

The structuralism of this argument is obvious. Text was largely
beside the point—again, there was “no express provision for the
223
case” —except perhaps as a secondary hook upon which to attach
the structural conclusion. Black explained, “You can root the result, if
you want to (and Marshall sometimes may seem to be doing this) in
the supremacy clause of Article VI, but that seems not a very
satisfying rationale, for Article VI declares the supremacy of
whatever the national law may turn out to be, and does not purport to
224
give content to that law.” Rather, “[i]n this, perhaps the greatest of
our constitutional cases, judgment is reached not fundamentally on
the basis of that kind of textual exegesis which we tend to regard as
normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total structure which
225
the text has created.”
Let us now return to the question of equal sovereignty, with this
method in mind. To be sure, the constitutional text is far from selfevidently conclusive here. But, as just noted, neither was the textual
226
support for McCulloch,
or, for that matter, for Marbury v.
227
Madison —which also famously relied primarily on abstract
222. McCulloch, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) at 426.
223. Id.
224. BLACK, supra note 218, at 15.
225. Id. Black also pointed to Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), which struck
down a state law imposing a tax on every person exiting the state, and explicitly rejected the
notion that the decision needed to be grounded in any particular constitutional text. See BLACK,
supra note 218, at 15–17. Black further explained that the Supreme Court’s early Dormant
Commerce Clause cases are best understood and defended as reasoning from constitutional
structure, rather than from the flimsy textual hook of the Commerce Clause itself. See id. at 19–
22.
226. See Metzger, supra note 216, at 102 (noting McCulloch’s “derivation of federal
immunity from state taxes, relying not on any specific textual provision but instead on the
general principle of federal supremacy and the representative differences between federal and
state governments”).
227. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
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structural reasoning, anchored only loosely to various textual hooks
228
that did little work on their own. When it comes to ascertaining
principles of constitutional structure—and of federalism in
particular—the Court often focuses primarily on the institutional
design of the constitutional system as a whole (informed by history),
and looks to the text not for concrete and free-standing answers, but
rather for textual hints that help us to understand and buttress the
core structure of the constitutional system.
That mode of reasoning supports the equal sovereignty principle.
Indeed, leaving aside for a moment the unique history and nature of
the American experience, equal sovereignty is an essential, implicit
structural component of virtually any federalist system of
government. Scholars of comparative federalism have often observed
that “[o]ne of the characteristics of federalism is its aspiration and
purpose simultaneously to generate and maintain both unity and
229
diversity.” Federalism “is from its roots a means to accommodate
230
diversity as a legitimate element in the polity.” A federalist system
is “an institutionalization of the compromise” between the centripetal
forces that pull toward greater centralization—the desire for
economic efficiency, security, and the like—and the centrifugal forces
demanding recognition and accommodation of diversity among the
231
member states. Such a system divides sovereignty between the
central and the regional governments, allowing efficient centralization
while simultaneously accommodating diversity by respecting the
rights of the regional governments to establish their own laws within
their own spheres of influence.
But granting certain powers to the central government—even
when limited only to those areas in which the demands for
centralization predominate—poses a substantial risk in a community
characterized by regional diversity. With diversity often comes

228. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 6 (1962) (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury
provided “merely a hint” of textual support for judicial review, and that “nothing more explicit
will be found”).
229. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 64 (1987); see id. at 274 n.23 (collecting
sources).
230. Id. at 66.
231. William S. Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, in AMERICAN FEDERALISM
IN PERSPECTIVE 33, 42 (Aaron Wildavsky, ed. 1967).
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animosity, and there is an ever-present danger that the central
government, even when it operates only within its legitimate spheres,
will be controlled by certain regional factions who will use its powers
to discriminate against and minimize the authority of the other
regional factions. Allowing that to happen would be inconsistent with
the very purpose of the federation: generating unity while respecting
diversity. It would contravene efforts to achieve unity, and it would
fail to respect the integrity and the diverse cultures of the weaker
regional states. For a federalist system to function effectively and
consistently with its overarching goals, then, the central government
must be compelled to respect and treat all member states—regardless
of their differences—as legitimate equal sovereigns. Thus, as scholars
of both domestic and comparative federalism have recognized for
decades, an antidiscrimination norm is inherent in the very notion of
a federalist system. Sovereign equality of the member states is
233
presumptively an essential, inherent structural feature of federalism
234
itself.
(Again, as the framers of the American Constitution

232. Cf. Larry May, How is Humanity Harmed by Genocide?, 10 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1,
17 (2004) (“Humans in their diversity must overcome the animosity that diversity inspires in
order to attain the promised equality.”).
233. Some scholars have noted—pointing to the situation of Canada and Quebec as an
example—that perhaps, when some regional states are extremely different from all of the
others, a federalist system could be structured in a way that gives greater sovereign powers to
those states than to others in order to protect their unique diversity. See Jaime Lluch, The
Constitutional and Political Recognition of Stateless Nations in Canada and the United States, 47
REVISTA JURÍDICA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA P.R. 549, 552–55 (2013) (explaining that
Quebec was given substantial powers to “guarantee[] its ability to make decisions in key areas,
without being overwhelmed by the larger society,” thereby convincing Quebec to join Canada).
Those scholars recognize, however, that the United States does not present such a situation.
Whereas, in the United States, “federalism is a conception of political federalism that assumes
the essential equality of the states and a relatively homogeneous country, Canadian federalism
is different, partly because of the distinctiveness of Quebec.” Id. at 554 (quoting SAMUEL
LASELVA, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM: PARADOXES,
ACHIEVEMENTS, AND THE TRAGEDIES OF NATIONHOOD 131 (1996)); cf. GORDON S. WOOD,
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 39, 48 (2009) (noting
that, although America at the time of the framing was much more ethnically diverse than most
European nations, it nonetheless was distinctive in its common language and comparatively
homogenous culture).
234. See, e.g., Arthur W. Macmahon, The Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in
FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 3, 5 (Arthur W. Macmahon ed. 1955) (“A further
essential is the equality of the constituent states, absolute as to legal status . . . .”); José Julián
Alvarez González, The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional Ruminations on the Citizenship Status
of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309, 334–35 (1990) (“Federalism presupposes that
states exist on equal standing before the national government, and that government has an
obligation to treat such states as equals.”); Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and
Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 235, 366 (2003) (“Federalism must start with a premise
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recognized, equal representative voting power is not essential to
235
equal sovereignty. But equal sovereignty is essential to federalism. )
If it is essential to federalism itself, then of course equal
sovereignty must be an inherent structural principle of the federalist
system set out in the American Constitution. And indeed it is, as the
236
cases and history discussed above make clear. The very nature of
our constitutional compact is one in which the states stand as equal
sovereigns. Again, the equal sovereignty principle “does not rest on
any express provision of the constitution . . . but on what is
considered . . . to be the general character and purpose of the union
237
of the states . . . —a union of political equals.” And because our
federalist system recognizes that the states retain genuine sovereignty
in vast areas in which Congress is empowered to act, our commitment
to the “perfect equality” of all of “members of the Confederacy” with
regard
to
their
“attributes
as . . . independent
sovereign

of formal equality among states—not because they are in fact equal, but because no other
genuinely federal principle is plausible.”); Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in
Principle and Practice: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91,
115 (1997) (noting “an essential principle of federalism (i.e., equality among the component
parts of the federation)”); cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Feb. 28, 1961, 12 BVerfGE 205 (Ger.), http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/
transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=652 [http://perma.cc/X3YT-9TNP] (“In the
Federal Republic of Germany, all states have the same constitutional status; they are States that
are entitled to equal treatment in transactions with the Federation.”); CHESTER JAMES
ANTIEAU, STATES’ RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS § 7.04 (1984) (“Constitutions in
federal societies are replete with a variety of provisions that guarantee equality of the states or
prohibit discrimination against the member states.”); GEOFFREY SAWER, MODERN
FEDERALISM 14, 16 (1969) (listing “Guarantees against Centre discrimination in dealings with
Regions” as among the standard features of federalist systems worldwide that have been
derived from the American system). This principle is sometimes referred to as (or is understood
to be contained within a broader principle that is sometimes referred to as) the principle of
“[f]ederal fairness,” SAWER, supra, at 16, or “federal comity,” EDWARD MCWHINNEY,
COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: STATES’ RIGHTS AND NATIONAL POWER 78–89 (1962).
There are, of course, many different theories of federalism—chief among them “dual
federalism,” “cooperative federalism,” and “dynamic federalism.” See ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR.,
FEDERALISM 183–224 (2011). But this Article’s argument does not depend on which of those
theories the reader prefers. Equal sovereignty is inherent in all of them.
235. Cf. Christoph Schönberger, Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea, 10
GERMAN L.J. 1201, 1215 (2009) (arguing that a system that gives small states disproportionately
large but not fully equal representation is consistent with basic principles of federalism, as
“federal comity [entails] an effort to accommodate the statehood of all Member States. A
federal Union of States always requires that the big states take into due consideration the
interests of smaller States”).
236. See supra Part II.A–B.
237. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (C.C.D. Or. 1889).
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238

must necessarily preclude Congress from
[g]overnment[s]”
239
overriding that sovereignty unequally.
The equal sovereignty principle has always been understood to
be essential to the harmony of the nation—as the foregoing cases and
history amply demonstrate. As far back as the 1790s, Republican
pamphleteer Joel Barlow sought to describe to the Europeans how,
here in America, “[t]he principle of equality guaranteed harmonious
240
union.” In his Advice to the Privileged Orders, first published in
1792, Barlow explained that, “[a]mong the several states, the
governments are all equal in their force, and the people are all equal
241
in their rights.” Barlow’s argument was that, “[j]ust as the state
constitutions secured individual rights, the federal Constitution
secured the rights of states; these states—as self-governing republics
guaranteed against internal subversion and external assault—were
much more comprehensively, substantially, and enduringly ‘equal’
242
than the states of Europe could ever hope to be.”
The sovereign equality of the American states may well have
exceeded that of the European nations, but it was nonetheless drawn
from European notions of international law. In the Declaration of
Independence, the American colonies freed themselves from British
control and declared themselves to be “Free and Independent
243
States.”
As the Supreme Court has observed, “[w]hen
independence was achieved, the precepts to be obeyed . . . were those
244
of international law.” Under the law of nations, all free states were

238.
239.
240.
241.

Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 92 (1857).
See supra notes 128–69 and accompanying text; infra note 264.
ONUF & ONUF, supra note 198, at 141 & n.48.
Joel Barlow, Advice to the Privileged Orders, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOEL
BARLOW 3, 67 (1796).
242. ONUF & ONUF, supra note 198, at 142.
243. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776); see also ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each State retains its Sovereignty, freedom and
independence . . . .”). To be sure, not all of the Framers were of the view that the states were
truly “free and independent” of each other as a result of the Declaration. To Wilson, Hamilton,
and other Federalists, the states declared their independence jointly, and had never—even
before the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution—individually possessed all of the
attributes of national sovereignty. See RAKOVE, supra note 196, at 163–68 (“For Wilson and
later nationalists, the idea that the states and nation emerged simultaneously, or that only a
national act . . . could give the states political identity, suggested that the rights they retained
were not absolute.”); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81,
at 324 (indicating that Wilson and Hamilton ascribed to the view that the States “were
independent, not Individually but Unitedly”).
244. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 378 (1934).
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entitled to the “perfect equality and absolute independence of
245
sovereigns.” When the states subsequently joined together under
the Constitution, they gave up some of that “absolute independence
of sovereigns,” but they manifested no desire to give up their “perfect
246
equality” as well.
That equality was not spelled out in so many words in the
Constitution. It was, rather, a background assumption on which the
247
Constitution was drafted. As Senator Pinkney put it, discussing in
245. The Schooner Ex. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116, 137 (1812); see EDWIN
DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 114–15, 120 (1920)
(“States are equal in the law of nations.”); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A
Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1328 (1996) (stating that “[u]nder the law
of nations, such ‘Free and Independent States’ are entitled to the ‘perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns’”); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1 (“The Organization is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
246. See Clark, supra note 245, at 1328 (illustrating that “[a]lthough the states necessarily
compromised their ‘absolute independence’ by uniting under the Constitution, it does not
follow that they forfeited their ‘absolute equality’”). As one Member of Congress later
expounded,
[a]t the Declaration of Independence, all the States were left perfectly equal and
sovereign. When the Articles of Confederation were formed, they were still equal and
sovereign, too, except so far as powers were surrendered in those articles. When these
articles were dissolved by the Federal Constitution, they were still equal and
sovereign in every respect, where powers were not surrendered by that instrument.
35 ANNALS OF CONG. 1258 (1820) (statement of Rep. Anderson). Professor Thomas Lee has
explained that “the Founders understood the States as sovereign entities bound together in an
interdependent coexistence very much like the community of nations, and they therefore
frequently consulted international law and political theory to craft rules conducive to a peaceful
and mutually respectful coexistence.” Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh
Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2002). Lee
argues that “the sovereign equality of the States” was one of the international law principles
that the Framers made a “purposive decision to incorporate into the Constitution”—rather than
to jettison. Id. at 1028; cf. Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal
Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 80–82 (2003) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s recent state
sovereign immunity cases can be understood as incorporating, from international law, notions of
state sovereign equality).
247. Other scholars have made this same observation, albeit without offering substantial
support or elaboration. See Clark, supra note 245, at 1328 (“[T]he Constitution proceeds on the
assumption that the states are coequal sovereigns within the federal union.”); Laycock, supra
note 107, at 288 (“The Constitution assumes, without ever quite saying so, that the several states
are of equal authority.”); James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry About Full Faith and
Credit to Laws, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1325 (1987) (“A major premise underlying American
federalism and our traditional concern for interstate autonomy is that the states are equal
sovereigns.”).
The notion of equal sovereignty might be seen as a “constitutional backdrop,” as
Stephen Sachs has helpfully used that phrase. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2012) (explaining that “constitutional ‘backdrops’” are
“rules of law that aren’t derivable from the Constitution’s text, but instead are left unaltered by
the text, and in fact are protected by the text from various kinds of legal change”).
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1820 the question whether Congress could abolish slavery in Missouri
alone, “the Constitution recognises” the “natural equality of
States, . . . not only because it does not deny them, but presumes them
248
to remain as they exist by the law of nature and nations.”
“Inequality in the sovereignty of States,” explained Senator Pinkney,
“is unnatural, and repugnant to all the principles of that law. Hence
we find it laid down by the text-writers on public law, that ‘Nature has
established a perfect equality of rights between independent
249
nations.’” Here, Senator Pinkney was quoting Emer de Vattel,
whose treatise, as Professor Thomas Lee has explained, “was the
most popular and widely available tract of its kind in late eighteenthcentury America,” and was “one of the most influential legal treatises
250
in American constitutional law.” “[T]he conceptualization of state
sovereignty in Vattel’s work” had a substantial impact on the
251
Framers’ shaping and understanding of our federalist system.
Vattel argued forcefully that equal sovereignty is a natural trait
252
of all states:
Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in
their rights and obligations, as equally proceeding from nature,—
nations composed of men, and considered as so many free persons
living together in a state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit
from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness
does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a
man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the
253
most powerful kingdom.

248. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 400 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney).
249. Id. (quoting Emer de Vattel); see EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. 2, ch.
111, § 36 (London ed. 1797) (1758) (“[N]ature has established a perfect equality of rights
between independent nations. Consequently none can naturally lay claim to any superior
prerogative: for, whatever privileges any one of them derives from freedom and sovereignty, the
others equally derive the same from the same source.”).
250. Lee, supra note 246, at 1061; see also id. at 1061–67 (recounting Vattel’s influence on
the Framers).
251. Id. at 1064–65.
252. Vattel “uses the words ‘State’ and ‘nation’ interchangeably.” Michael B. Rappaport,
Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth
and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 832 (1999).
253. VATTEL, supra note 249, prelim. § 18. Vattel specifically noted that “several sovereign
and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy” into a
“federal republic” “without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect state.” Id. bk. 1, ch. 1,
§ 10.
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This was the backdrop understanding against which the Framers
254
had operated. Without expressly saying so, explained Senator
Pinkney, the “Constitution of the United States proceeds upon the
truth of this doctrine. It takes the States as it finds them, free and
sovereign alike by nature. . . . It diminishes the individual sovereignty
of each, and transfers, what it subtracts, to the Government which it
creates: it takes from all alike, and leaves them relatively to each
255
other equal in sovereign power.”
If we are looking for textual clues, then, we might flip the burden
256
of proof and begin with the dog that did not bark. Given the
historical background, we might reasonably expect that, if the
Framers had meant to disturb the fundamental notion of equal
sovereignty that prevailed in the law of nations and consumed the
delegates at the Convention, they would have done so explicitly. But
they did not. As Professor Douglas Laycock has noted, “[e]very
reference to state authority is to the states generically; no provision
257
gives more authority to some states than to others.”
If we are nonetheless going to demand affirmative textual
“hooks”—hints in the text to buttress and validate the background
structural principle—we need look no further than the preamble.
“We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
Union, . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
258
States of America.” The very notion of a “union” would seem
259
implicitly to suggest the equality of the member states. It is, of
course, true (as Professor David Currie has observed) that “unions of
260
unequal states are surely conceivable.” But, especially in light of the
historical context in which the Constitution was drafted, “a more
261
perfect Union” must be a union of equals.

254. Recall that Luther Martin quoted these same passages from Vattel in calling for equal
sovereignty at the Convention. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
255. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 400 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney).
256. Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (“Congress’[s] silence in this
regard can be likened to the dog that did not bark.” (citing Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver
Blaze, in 1 THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335 (1927))).
257. Laycock, supra note 107, at 288.
258. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
259. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 507 (2008) (observing
that “the equality norm may have some implicit textual foundation in the Constitution’s vision
of a ‘Union’”); see also supra Part II.A; supra note 177.
260. CURRIE, supra note 139, at 243. Those unions would probably not, however, establish
federalist systems of government.
261. As one early nineteenth century representative put it,
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On top of that, not only do the states enjoy equal representation
262
in the Senate, but the Constitution purports to insulate that equality
263
permanently from the possibility of amendment. This speaks
directly to a deep constitutional commitment to equal sovereignty
264
among the states.

[a] principal object of the Constitution was ‘to form a more perfect union.’ The
parties made an equal surrender of sovereignty, and retained equal powers in the
Federal Government. The sovereignty ceded is equally operative upon every State.
The powers exercised by the several States, in Congress, are equal—in the Senate, in
numbers; in the House, in strength.
35 ANNALS OF CONG. 975 (1820) (statement of Rep. Holmes).
262. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
263. See id. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate [through constitutional amendment].”).
264. See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 600 (1816) (statement of Rep. Wright) (“The Senate
represented the sovereignty of the States; and the sovereignty of the States, like all
sovereignties, are equal, and, of course, correctly equally represented.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
39, at 255 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The Senate . . . will derive its powers
from the States, as political and co-equal societies; and these will be represented on the
principle of equality in the Senate . . . .”); id. NO. 43, at 296 (James Madison) (noting in a
discussion of Article V that “[t]he exception in favour of the equality of suffrage in the Senate
was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and
secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the Legislature; and was probably
insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality”); RAKOVE, supra note 196, at
170 (“After July 16, no one could deny that the Senate was intended to embody the equal
sovereignty of the states . . . .”); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 173, § 691 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (noting that, in the Senate,
“each state in its political capacity is represented upon a footing of perfect equality, like a
congress of sovereigns”); id. at 178, § 696 (noting that the Senate is “fixed upon an absolute
equality, as the representative of state sovereignty”); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 46
(statement of Fisher Ames at the Massachusetts ratifying convention) (“The senators [in their
equal numbers] represent the sovereignty of the states . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 47
(statement of Rufus King at the Massachusetts convention) (“[T]he Senate preserved the
equality of the states . . . .”); id. at 319 (statement of Alexander Hamilton at the New York
convention) (admitting that “the equal vote in the Senate was given to secure the rights of the
states” (emphasis omitted)); 4 id. at 125 (statement of James Iredell at the North Carolina
convention) (“[T]he great caution of giving the states an equality of suffrage in making treaties,
was for the express purpose of taking care of [state] sovereignty.”); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 371 (Mar. 30, 1796, Message from President
Washington to the House of Representatives on Jay’s Treaty) (asserting, “[h]aving been a
member of the General Convention, and knowing the principles on which the Constitution was
formed,” that “the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller States were deemed essentially
to depend” on equal suffrage in the Senate); Clark, supra note 245, at 1328; Erbsen, supra note
259, at 507–08; Metzger, supra note 83, at 1518.
Of course, as a result of the Connecticut Compromise, the states do not have equal
representation in the House of Representatives. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
But the fact of permanent equality in the Senate, along with the history recounted above, see
supra Part II.B, demonstrates that the compromise was not intended or understood to
undermine the sovereign equality of the states. As one former House representative observed,
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Finally, perhaps textual support for striking down laws that
violate the equal sovereignty principle can be found in the Necessary
265
and Proper Clause —in particular in its propriety requirement. The
Supreme Court has previously established that “a law is not proper
for carrying into Execution” a federal power within the meaning of
that clause “when it violates a constitutional principle of state
sovereignty”—even if that principle is not otherwise expressly
266
enumerated in the constitutional text. On that reasoning, a law that

[t]he sovereignty of each State was solemnly guarantied [sic] by the Constitution, and
as each State, whether great or small, was equally sovereign and independent, each
State is equally represented in the Senate of the United States; each State sends two
members; and this is the federative feature in our Constitution; but the House of
Representatives was intended as the immediate representation of the people of the
United States.
17 ANNALS OF CONG. 911 (1807) (statement of Rep. Key).
Further support for the notion that this constitutional commitment to equal sovereignty
should be understood to limit Congress’s ability to exercise its legitimate powers in a way that
unequally curtails state sovereignty can be found in Benjamin Franklin’s proposed compromise
regarding the method of representation in the Congress. To resolve the impasse between the
small and large states, see supra Part II.B, Franklin initially proposed full proportional
representation in the House, but that the Senate’s voting rules should vary according to the
nature of the action being taken. Generally, the Senate should vote by proportional
representation (apportioned not strictly by population, but rather by the amount of money that
each state contributes to the federal treasury), but “in all cases or questions wherein the
Sovereignty of individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over their own
Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government within the several
States augmented, each State shall have equal suffrage” in the Senate. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 489. This was a highly impractical suggestion,
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 257 (2d ed. 1937), and it went
nowhere; the impasse was eventually resolved instead by the Connecticut Compromise, see
supra Part II.B, in which Franklin also played a role, see 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 526. But Franklin’s proposal nonetheless illustrates that
the guarantee of equal representation in the Senate was tied up with concerns about Congress’s
ability to use its delegated powers to infringe upon state sovereignty, perhaps in a
discriminatory manner. That is to say, the equal sovereignty that many of the Framers were
committed to protecting was the states’ “authority over their own Citizens” and the “authority
of the General Government within the several States,” id. at 489, and the Framers were
committed to protecting that equal sovereignty from the acts of Congress.
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”).
266. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis and brackets
omitted) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997)); see also Gary Lawson &
Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 322–23 (1993) (hypothesizing that principles of state
sovereignty embodied in the Necessary and Proper clause may limit Congress’s authority). But
see J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 581, 638–40 (questioning the validity of this interpretation of the clause); Manning,

COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

IN DEFENSE OF EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY

2/21/2016 10:25 PM

1145

violates the equal sovereignty principle is not consistent with the
267
Necessary and Proper Clause.
This last is surely something of a flimsy textual hook, as it is
ultimately circular. It does not so much give us a textual indication of
what the unwritten structural principles of federalism are as it gives us
a textual anchor for reading those structural principles—whenever we
268
find them elsewhere—into the constitutional text.
269
And it is therefore highly manipulable. An injudicious judge
might strike down a law that is otherwise consistent with the
Constitution on the ground that it contravenes the judge’s own,
personal view of the appropriate—the “proper”—federal–state
balance, and is therefore, according to the judge, beyond the scope of
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
This is a serious concern, to be sure. And it is one that extends
more broadly—not just to the manipulability of abstract textual
hooks like “proper,” but also to the entire use of nontextual,
structural reasoning of the type championed by Charles Black and
Foreword, supra note 212, at 32, 48–67 (noting that “the Court treats the ‘propriety’
requirement of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a textual hook for the assertion of broad
judicial power to judge the appropriateness of legislatively prescribed means” and criticizing this
practice).
267. Other textual hooks might include (1) the requirement in the Effects Clause of Article
IV, section 1, that Congress act pursuant to “general laws,” see Metzger, supra note 83, at 1494,
1518; (2) the provision of Article II, section 1 that provides that, in the event that no candidate
for President receives a majority of the electoral vote, the House of Representatives shall
choose the President from the top five vote-getters, but “the Votes shall be taken by States, the
Representation from each State having one Vote,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also Letter from
James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 202, at 148–49 (noting that this provision was “an accommodation to the anxiety of the
smaller States for their sovereign equality”); (3) the use throughout the Constitution of the
word “State,” which at the time of the framing was understood to refer to an independent
government with the attributes of sovereignty cataloged by Vattel and other writers, see
Rappaport, supra note 252, at 830–34; (4) and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV,
section 10, see Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective
of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 98 (1981) (“[T]he broad, organic purpose
of the full faith and credit clause is to promote equality among the states and respect for the
sovereignty of each state in the federal system . . . .”). For an argument that the Eleventh
Amendment is also a textual reflection of the principle of equal sovereignty among the states,
see Lee, supra note 246 at 1032–40.
268. Cf. supra note 224 and accompanying text (noting that the same can be said of the
textual hook in McCulloch).
269. See Manning, Foreword, supra note 212, at 54–57 (noting that, “[b]ecause neither
[federalism nor separation of powers] provides firm answers in the abstract, the particulars of
each almost invariably require the creation, rather than the excavation, of constitutional
meaning,” and explaining that the Necessary and Proper Clause in particular “unquestionably
delegates interpretive lawmaking discretion”).
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employed here. Professor Michael Dorf has argued that, despite its
strong appeal, Charles Black-style structural reasoning is
underutilized in constitutional theory precisely because, “a
constitutional regime still haunted by the ghost of Lochner and
fearful, by turns, of both politically conservative and politically liberal
overreaching by the judiciary, inference from institutional structures
appears to be too open-ended a methodology” when compared to
arguments grounded more clearly in the language of the document
270
itself.
The point is well taken. This is not the place to attempt a full271
throated defense of structural reasoning in constitutional law. I will
instead offer two very brief observations. First, for better or for
worse, this type of reasoning is already commonplace in federalism
cases. Whatever normative view one takes about what should be the
proper method of constitutional interpretation in the federalism
arena, the fact remains that the equal sovereignty principle fits well
within the currently prevailing structuralist methodology for crafting
272
federalism doctrine. Second, to admit that this type of reasoning is
susceptible to manipulation is not to suggest that any particular
application of it is necessarily invalid. The validity of a particular
structural decision depends on the strength of the historical evidence
and structural arguments upon which it is based. I am personally
inclined to believe that some of the Supreme Court’s recent,

270. Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method or How Charles Black
Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional Timidity, 92 GEO.
L.J. 833, 838 (2004) (referring to Lochner v. New York, 298 U.S. 45 (1905)).
271. For a thoughtful defense of Professor Black’s approach, see Metzger, supra note 216, at
103–05; see also Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1998) (defending Black’s approach not as a means of ignoring or
contravening the text, but rather as a means “to determine the specific import of the
constitutional text by reference to the constitutional structure”). In short, structural reasoning
has the benefits of practicality, functionalism, and common sense. As Black explains, some
things just have to be true of the Constitution for it to fulfill its functions effectively, regardless
of whether those things are spelled out in the text. See BLACK, supra note 218, at 12 (“Could a
state make it a crime to file suit in a federal court? Could a state provide that lifelong
disqualification from voting or holding property was to result from even a short service in the
United States Army?”). Structural reasoning allows us to focus on “the practicalities and
proprieties of the thing, without getting out dictionaries whose entries will not really respond to
the question we are putting, or scanning utterances, contemporary with the text, of persons who
did not really face the question we are asking.” Id. at 22–23.
272. Indeed, as Professor Metzger explains, categorically rejecting this type of structural
reasoning would have a serious destabilizing effect and would call into question the legitimacy
of a huge body of constitutional doctrine, both in federalism cases and elsewhere in the
constitutional corpus juris. Metzger, supra note 216, at 103–05.
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nontextual federalism decisions were wrongly decided, precisely
because I do not find the historical evidence and structural arguments
273
upon which they are based to be sufficiently compelling. But, in my
view, the structure, history, and precedent discussed here make equal
sovereignty a very different case.
III. THE BASIC CONTOURS OF THE EQUAL
SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
Critics of the Court’s invocation of equal sovereignty, including
Justice Ginsburg in her Shelby County dissent, have emphasized—to
suggest either that the equal sovereignty principle is utterly
revolutionary, or that it cannot possibly be right—that Congress
routinely discriminates among the states. “Federal statutes that treat
States disparately,” observes Justice Ginsburg, “are hardly novelties.
Do such provisions remain safe given the Court’s expansion of equal
274
sovereignty’s sway?” Condemning the Shelby County decision,
Professor Eric Posner opines that, “[i]n fact, the federal government
doesn’t treat states equally and couldn’t possibly. Nearly all laws
affect different states differently. . . . So whatever explains the court’s
decision today, the putative principle of equal sovereignty can’t be
275
it.”
But these arguments are too crude. A more refined
understanding of equal sovereignty demonstrates that the vast
majority of congressional discrimination among the states—including
the vast majority of legislation flagged by critics—does not run afoul
of the Constitution.

273. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760–814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority opinion not for employing the wrong methodology, but rather for drawing the wrong
conclusions from history and structure); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 970–76 (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
274. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
275. Posner, supra note 4; see also, e.g., Price, supra note 24, at 28–29 (“Congress routinely
enacts legislation that presumes only a rational basis is necessary for unequal treatment of
states. . . . Courts have never before considered such legislation suspect.”); cf. Reva B. Siegel,
Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 71 (2013) (“[O]ne could marvel at the
Court’s willingness to treat differentiation among states, in this context, as an affront, without
ever explaining how it is different from the other contexts in which Congress differentiates
among states.”).
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A. What Equal Soverignty Is Not
To be sure, the Framers were deeply concerned that Congress
276
might use its delegated powers to discriminate among the states.
“The fears and jealousies among the states and the apprehensions
that the general legislature might discriminate in favor of one state or
region to the economic detriment of another were among the most
277
strident themes of the Convention.” The equal sovereignty principle
must be understood in light of those fears.
Yet the Framers fully realized that perfect equality of federal
legislation is not possible. At the very least, even laws that are drafted
in facially nondiscriminatory terms will almost always have a greater
impact on some states than others. For instance, at the Constitutional
Convention, the Southern delegates—whose states had no shipbuilding industry—feared that, once the federal government was
vested with the power to regulate commerce, the Northern states
would force through Congress a bill (similar to those that had already
been enacted in some Northern states) requiring all American
imports and exports to be carried in American-made ships. Such a law
would have greatly enhanced the Northern ship-building industry at
278
the expense of Southern exports to foreign nations. But it was well
understood that it would be constitutional. Indeed, some AntiFederalists opposed ratification for just this reason. Luther Martin,
for instance, lamented to the Maryland legislature that Congress was
empowered to enact taxes and regulations that would have a
disparate effect on certain states:
[T]hough there is a provision that all duties, imposts, and excises,
shall be uniform,—that is, to be laid to the same amount on the
same articles in each state,—yet this will not prevent Congress from
having it in their power to cause them to fall very unequally, and
much heavier on some states than on others, because these duties
may be laid on articles but little or not at all used in some states, and
of absolute necessity for the use and consumption of others; in which
case, the first would pay little or no part of the revenue arising
therefrom, while the whole, or nearly the whole, of it would be paid

276. This point is discussed in detail in Colby, supra note 11, at 266–88.
277. Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 37–38 (1983).
278. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 450–53
(reflecting widespread agreement that such a law would benefit the North at the expense of the
South); WARREN, supra note 264, at 579–80 (same).
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by the last, to wit, the states which use and consume the articles on
279
which the imposts and excises are laid.

But the Constitution was ratified anyway, with a full understanding
that it was unavoidable that many acts of Congress would be
discriminatory in effect. As the Supreme Court observed in the
nineteenth century, in rejecting an argument that Congress had
impermissibly discriminated between states, “[p]erfect uniformity and
perfect equality of taxation [and regulation], in all the aspects in
280
which the human mind can view it, is a baseless dream.”
The equal sovereignty principle thus does not categorically
281
preclude Congress from “treat[ing] States disparately” in any
manner whatsoever; it does not foreclose “all laws [that] affect
282
different states differently.” It is a guarantee of equal sovereignty,
not of equal treatment in all respects. Of course, “‘[s]overeignty’ is a
283
term used in many senses and is much abused.” But, as the
foregoing makes clear, when they are discussing the equal sovereignty
principle, judges and politicians (including the Framers) are using the
term in its dictionary sense, to refer to a state’s “independent
284
authority and . . . right to govern itself.” Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “state sovereignty” as the “right of a state to self285
government.” Thus, “[t]he true constitutional equality between the
states only extends to the right of each, under the constitution, to
have and enjoy the same measure of local or self-government, and to
be admitted to an equal participation in the maintenance,
administration, and conduct of the common or national
286
government.” Far from being a sweeping mandate for across-theboard state equality, the equal sovereignty principle is nothing more
than “the truism that the Union under the Constitution is essentially
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 60, at 369.
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884).
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Posner, supra note 4.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754 (2008) (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 cmt. b (1986)); see generally John
Hilla, The Literary Effect of Sovereignty in International Law, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 77 (2008)
(reviewing the variety of conceptual and linguistic meanings that have attached to
“sovereignty”).
284. Sovereignty,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
sovereignty [http://perma.cc/9MTP-T3WC].
285. State Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (indicating that this
definition dates back to the eighteenth century).
286. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (C.C.D. Or. 1889).
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one of States equal in local governmental power.” And so, unequal
or discriminatory federal laws implicate the equal sovereignty
principle only when they grant more regulatory authority or capacity
for self-government to some states than to others (or allow some
states a greater role than others in the federal government).
The equal sovereignty principle is therefore not undermined by,
nor does it threaten, federal laws that are drafted in general,
288
nongeographic terms, but have a disparate impact on some states.
Such laws treat the states as equal sovereigns; they just end up
289
affecting some states more than others. To the extent that such a
law undermines state sovereignty, all states have the same decreased
sovereign rights over its subject matter, even if the reduction in
sovereignty ends up mattering much more to some states than to
290
others.

287. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 593 (1918).
288. As the Supreme Court has observed,
[t]he “equal footing” clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to
sovereignty. It does not, of course, include economic stature or standing. There has
never been equality among the States in that sense. . . . Area, location, geology, and
latitude have created great diversity in the economic aspects of the several States. The
requirement of equal footing was designed not to wipe out those diversities but to
create parity as respects political standing and sovereignty.
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950) (citations omitted). A law of this sort could
implicate equal sovereignty only if a disadvantaged state “was deprived of any right to
participate in the national political process or . . . was singled out in a way that left it politically
isolated and powerless.” South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512–13 (1988).
289. Cf. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884) (“Is the tax on tobacco void,
because in many of the States no tobacco is raised or manufactured? . . . The tax is uniform
when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”).
290. As such, Professor Posner does not undermine the equal sovereignty principle by
pointing out that “[d]isaster-relief laws benefit disaster-prone states at the expense of disasterfree states. Pollution-control laws burden industrial states. Progressive taxes burden states
where the rich are concentrated.” Posner, supra note 4; see also id. (“Indeed, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act will continue to burden states with substantial minority populations relative
to other states, just because you can’t discriminate against a minority population that doesn’t
exist.”). Nor does Professor Price when he notes that “benefits formulas may result in unequal
distribution of funds, depending on where eligible beneficiaries (whether individuals, school
districts, foundations, or other parties) reside.” Price, supra note 24, at 28 (discussing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1411 (2006) (special education funding); 23 U.S.C. § 104 (2006) (highway funding); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d (2006) (medical assistance benefit formulas)).
The same can be said of Justice Stevens’s assertion that the Three-Fifths Clause of
Article I, section 2—which ended up giving the Southern states more voting power in the House
of Representatives than they would have had if slaves had not been counted in apportionment
at all—“created a basic inequality between the slave states and the free states” that
“contradict[s] the notion that the ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States’
is a part of our unwritten Constitution.” John Paul Stevens, The Court and the Right to Vote: A
Dissent, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 37 (Aug. 15, 2013) (reviewing GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD
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The same is true of federal spending. The fact that the federal
government spends money in ways that benefit some states more than
291
others does not implicate the equal sovereignty principle. The
Supreme Court has long held that federal spending does not infringe
upon state sovereignty unless it amounts to “coercion” or
“compulsion” of the state governments that effectively removes their
292
agency as independent sovereigns. Giving money to one state but
JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2013)). Under the Three-Fifths Clause, all states retained the same sovereign right to
implement slavery (and thus increase their populations for apportionment purposes), even
though the South chose to rely much more on slavery than did the North. Indeed, although
slavery was much more widespread in the South, it persisted in all but one Northern state at the
time of the framing, and the slaves in the Northern states, just like in their Southern
counterparts, were counted as three-fifths persons in the early congressional apportionments.
See Charles M. Biles, Congressional Apportionment Based on the 1790 Census 6–9 (Mar. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://media.wix.com/ugd/9ae4b0_6cec7ab68b6141809555aecfc33f20
e8.pdf [http://perma.cc/8W8J-ECWP].
291. Most of the statutes that Justice Ginsburg listed as potentially imperiled in her Shelby
County dissent fall into this category:
26 U.S.C. § 142(l) (EPA required to locate green building project in a State meeting
specified population criteria); 42 U.S.C. § 3796bb (at least 50 percent of rural drug
enforcement assistance funding must be allocated to States with “a population density
of fifty-two or fewer persons per square mile or a State in which the largest county
has fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand people, based on the decennial census
of 1990 through fiscal year 1997”); §§ 13925, 13971 (similar population criteria for
funding to combat rural domestic violence); § 10136 (specifying rules applicable to
Nevada’s Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site, and providing that “[n]o State, other
than the State of Nevada, may receive financial assistance under this subsection after
December 22, 1987”).
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). So do many of the
laws that Professor Price cites to undermine the equal sovereignty principle. Price refers to
“notorious congressional ‘earmarks’—line items funding particular parties or projects—that
litter annual appropriations bills and single out particular entities, localities, or even states for
federal largesse.” Price, supra note 24, at 28. Price notes in particular the Water Resources
Development Act of 2007 (which appropriates funds for various specified navigation-related
projects), the appropriation of funds for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012, and the Disaster
Relief Appropriations Act of 2012 (which appropriates funds for repairs on the Mississippi
River and its tributaries). Id. at 28 n.22. Price further adds that “Congress sometimes establishes
pilot projects that test particular federal initiatives in one state or several states before imposing
them on the nation as a whole” and provides as examples
42 U.S.C. § 280g-6 (Supp. V 2012) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to select “at least 3 states” for pilot projects relating to chronic kidney
disease); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-55, div. A, tit. VII, § 727, 125 Stat. 552, 585 (2011) (funding a pilot project to test
reforestation techniques in Gulf Coast areas); tit. III, 125 Stat. at 567 (appropriating
funds “to conduct a demonstration” regarding certain public housing programs).
Id. at 128 & n.23.
292. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–03 (2012)
(“Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with
federal policies. But when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ . . . the legislation runs contrary to
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not another—or spending money in one state but not another—is a
form of discrimination, but not one that directly impedes the
regulatory authority or sovereign autonomy of the state that got the
293
short end of the stick.
In seeking to discredit the equal sovereignty principle, Professor
Price notes the prevalence of federal laws that burden or reward the
states unequally in various ways, such as those just mentioned, and
explains that “[c]ourts have never before considered such legislation
294
suspect.” Price continues,
In perhaps the most thorough consideration of the issue to date, the
D.C. Circuit rejected arguments that the location of the federal

our system of federalism.” (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)));
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“Our decisions have recognized that in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590)).
For that reason, discriminatory conditions imposed on federal funds do not violate the equal
sovereignty principle unless the conditions are unduly coercive. Accordingly, despite Professor
Price’s contrary suggestion, the equal sovereignty principle is not undermined by, or
inconsistent with, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-55 § 211, 125 Stat. 552, 695 (2011), which exempts “[a] public housing agency or such
other entity that administers Federal housing assistance for the Housing Authority of the county
of Los Angeles, California, the States of Alaska, Iowa, and Mississippi” from the requirement
that such entities must generally include a resident on their respective governing bodies, Price,
supra note 24, at 29 n.26.
293. It is no doubt true that there can be indirect, attenuated effects on equal sovereignty
both from facially neutral federal laws that have a disparate impact and from unequal federal
spending. For instance, a federal tax on individuals or activities that hits some states extremely
hard, while leaving others virtually untouched—such as a tax on corn farming or oil
production—can limit the burdened states’ practical ability to raise their own state taxes.
(People only have so much money and will only tolerate a certain combined federal and state
tax burden.) That reality, in turn, limits the burdened states’ practical ability to fund
government initiatives relative to their peers, which, in a sense, limits the comparative extent to
which they can realistically exercise their sovereign authority. Likewise, lavish federal spending
for, say, infrastructure improvements in some states but not others can functionally require the
other states to raise the money for the same ends themselves, through state taxes, which
effectively limits their ability to raise funds to pursue other governmental initiatives—which, in
turn, limits the amount of sovereign power that they can in practice exercise relative to the
other states. But no court has ever suggested that such laws violate the equal sovereignty
principle. Nor could they. Since all federal laws are discriminatory in effect, see Colby, supra
note 11, at 329 (“For better or for worse, disparate impact of this sort is an unavoidable
consequence of nationwide regulation in a diverse country.”), and it is often impossible for
Congress to spend money in an entirely equal manner, see id. at 332–33 (“[T]his type of
‘discrimination,’ however unfortunate and however contrary to the spirit of the Convention, is
simply unavoidable . . . .”), if the equal sovereignty principle extended that far, it would mean
the end of the federal government. But the principle does not, of course, extend that far; it is
concerned instead only with direct, categorical restrictions on state sovereignty.
294. Price, supra note 24, at 29.
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nuclear waste facility in Nevada violated a constitutional principle of
state equal treatment. Although Nevada argued that the facility’s
selection violated a constitutional requirement that federal
legislation treat states equally, the D.C. Circuit found ‘no basis in
295
the Constitution’ for Nevada’s argument.

But the D.C. Circuit was absolutely correct to reject Nevada’s
assertion that there is a generalized “‘equal treatment’ requirement”
296
that runs throughout the Constitution. There is not. There is,
instead, a limited principle of equal sovereignty. The law at issue in
297
the D.C. Circuit case was enacted pursuant to the Property Clause.
Congress was simply choosing what use to make of some property
that the federal government owns in Nevada; it was not interfering
with the state’s powers of self-government. As the D.C. Circuit
correctly noted, “while the designation of Yucca as a repository may
impose a burden on Nevada, it does not infringe upon state sovereign
interests” in a way that implicates the structure of constitutional
298
federalism.
Even laws that explicitly regulate unevenly between the states in
geographic terms do not necessarily implicate the equal sovereignty
principle. Congress might well regulate individuals in different states
in a discriminatory manner—even explicitly along state lines—
299
without raising equal sovereignty concerns. Regulating individuals
differently in different states implicates the equal sovereignty
principle only when it has the effect—in conjunction with the
Supremacy Clause—of limiting the sovereign authority of some
states, but not others. So, for instance, a federal law that prescribes a
greater punishment for counterfeiting United States currency in State
295. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1305 (D.C.
Cir. 2004)).
296. Nuclear Energy Inst., 373 F.3d at 1305.
297. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States . . . .”).
298. Nuclear Energy Inst., 373 F.3d at 1306.
299. To be sure, such discrimination would often be unconstitutional if Congress were
exercising a power upon which the Constitution imposes a uniformity constraint. For instance,
the Constitution empowers Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4. Creating an easier path to citizenship in Massachusetts, or more stringent rules for
discharging debt in the South, would be unconstitutional not because of the equal sovereignty
principle, but rather because of the uniformity constraint imposed on Congress’s exercise of
those powers. For an argument that such a constraint is also implicitly contained within the
commerce power, see Colby, supra note 11, at 301–46.
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A than in State B, or that sets a higher price for stamps in State A
than in State B, does not implicate equal sovereignty because it does
not unequally affect the states’ sovereign authority to govern.
B. What Equal Sovereignty Is
But equal sovereignty would be implicated by a federal law that
provided that State A is permitted to regulate in a particular area, but
300
State B is not. Such a law would discriminatorily regulate the states
directly, in their exercise of their sovereign authority. And equal
sovereignty would also be implicated by a federal law that regulated
individuals, rather than the states themselves, but applied only in
State A, and not in State B—if the federal law had the preemptive
effect of precluding State A, but not State B, from regulating in the
area. Imagine, for instance, a federal law prohibiting bullfighting in
Texas. Such a law would operate directly upon individuals—those
who wish to conduct bull fights—rather than the states. But it would
have an immediate impact upon the sovereign regulatory authority of
the State of Texas, relative to its peers. By operation of the
Supremacy Clause, the federal law would preempt any attempt by
Texas to exercise its sovereign authority to enact legislation
permitting or regulating bullfighting. But since the federal law would
not apply outside of Texas, the other forty-nine states would be free
to regulate bullfighting as they saw fit. Texas would be denied its
301
equal sovereignty.
Once we understand the limited nature of the equal sovereignty
principle, we can see that most of the federal laws identified by
Justice Ginsburg as imperiled by the equal sovereignty principle are
302
not, in fact, threatened at all. But one of the laws that she invokes
does indeed fit the bill: the Professional and Amateur Sports
303
Protection Act of 1992 —discussed in the Introduction to this
Article—which prohibits sports gambling, but exempts Nevada from

300. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) (2012) (exempting Hawaii’s prepaid health plan law from the
scope of ERISA preemption).
301. As explained above, federal preemption implicates state sovereignty, but not in a way
that generally runs afoul of the Constitution. Geographically discriminatory preemption,
however, does violate a fundamental principle of federalism. See supra Part II.A (discussing the
equal footing principle).
302. See supra notes 290–98 and accompanying text.
303. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-559, 106 Stat.
4227 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704).
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304

its scope. PASPA “does not merely regulate private conduct; it
curtails the regulatory and revenue-raising authority of the states. It
precludes non-exempted states from legalizing sports gambling . . . .
Nevada may derive enormous financial benefits from casino sports
305
book betting, but other states may not.”
As such, PASPA
306
contravenes the principle of equal state sovereignty.
Professor Price identifies another federal law that raises genuine
equal sovereignty concerns: the Clean Air Act, which “permits one
state (California) to establish its own more stringent motor vehicle
emissions and engine design standards while requiring other states to
follow either California’s standards or standards established by the
307
federal government.”
The fact that we can identify, at most, only a handful of current
federal laws that do not afford equal sovereignty to the states suggests
that the equal sovereignty principle is not actually “capable of [as]
308
much mischief” as Justice Ginsburg initially feared. It also dispels
the assertion that the sheer volume of federal laws that violate it
indicates that the principle cannot possibly be valid.
What is more, the simple fact that a law raises equal sovereignty
concerns does not render it automatically unconstitutional, just as the
mere fact that a law discriminates between people on the basis of a
suspect classification does not necessarily mean that it is invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause. Like most other constitutional
309
principles, equal sovereignty is not absolute. A federal statute that
contravenes the equal sovereignty principle should simply trigger

304. See id. § 3704; Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also Price, supra note 24, at 29 nn.26–27 (arguing that PASPA’s existence
undermines the equal sovereignty principle). A more complete discussion of PASPA’s
exemptions can be found in Colby, supra note 11, at 250 n.3.
305. Colby, supra note 11, at 250–51.
306. See Justin Willis McKithen, Note, Playing Favorites: Congress’s Denial of Equal
Sovereignty to the States in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 49 GA. L. REV.
539, 560–62 (2015) (arguing that PASPA violates the equal sovereignty principle).
307. Price, supra note 24, at 29. Price argues that courts “have rejected challenges to the
Clean Air Act provisions granting special regulatory powers only to California.” Id. at 29 n.27
(citing, for this proposition, Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d
1031 (9th Cir. 2007); Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 208
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1998); Virginia v.
EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). But none of those cases directly addressed or upheld the
discrimination between states.
308. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
309. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (“Distinctions
can be justified in some cases.”).
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some form of heightened scrutiny, requiring the federal government
to justify the disparate treatment. The Supreme Court expressed that
understanding in Northwest Austin when it announced that “a
departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is
310
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” The Court has yet
to spell out the exact contours of that inquiry; those will have to be
worked out in detail over time. But, however the test is ultimately
structured, at base, it will require Congress to provide a strong
311
justification for treating the states as unequal sovereigns.
In the case of PASPA, it is highly questionable whether such a
justification can be found. Even Congress admitted that the problem
312
that the law addresses is national in scope. The only possible
justification for treating the states differently is a desire to
“grandfather” existing state laws that had relied to a substantial
313
degree on the lack of contrary federal regulation. Whether that is a
sufficient justification for permanently favoring some states over

310. Id.; see also Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (“At the same time, as we made clear in
Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in
assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”).
311. The Supreme Court has already developed a body of caselaw addressing similar
concerns in the somewhat analogous context of the Tax Uniformity Clause and the Bankruptcy
Clause, both of which require Congress to legislate uniformly among the states. See Colby,
supra note 11, at 335–40 (analyzing the cases). Those cases are not as clear and consistent as one
might hope, but in essence they establish the proposition that “Congress is empowered to tackle
geographically isolated problems, but . . . federal laws must apply uniformly wherever those
problems are presented.” Id. at 336; see also The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. 102, 159 (1974) (“The uniformity provision does not deny Congress the power to take into
account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation
to resolve geographically isolated problems.”).
312. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3556
(“Sports gambling is a national problem.”).
313. See id. at 8 (“Neither has the committee any desire to threaten the economy of Nevada,
which over many decades has come to depend on legalized private gambling, including sports
gambling, as an essential industry, or to prohibit lawful sports gambling schemes in other States
that were in operation when the legislation was introduced.”). Other examples of federal
statutes that trigger equal sovereignty concerns by grandfathering existing state laws include the
Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 151), which precludes all state taxes on Internet access, but exempts those state taxes already
in place when the statute was enacted. The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896
(1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 55a), which precludes the states from requiring individuals to
disclose their social security numbers to receive a government benefit or to exercise a right, but
exempts those states that already required disclosure as a condition of voting, provides another
example. See McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 2000).
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others in their ability to regulate an important subject is, at the very
314
least, a dubious proposition.
The Clean Air Act should trigger a similar analysis. It too is a
315
“grandfather” law. It generally prohibits the states from enacting
their own motor vehicle emissions standards, but provides that the
Environmental Protection Agency can waive preemption for states
316
that regulated auto emissions prior to March 30, 1966. Congress was
317
well aware that only California meets that condition. Unlike
PASPA, the Clean Air Act does not simply allow California to leave
in place its preexisting regulations; it empowers California—and only
California—to continue to promulgate new emissions standards.
California alone is granted, in the words of one House Report, “the
broadest possible discretion in selecting the best means to protect the
318
health of its citizens and the public welfare.” This is a classic
example of unequal sovereignty. The question is whether California’s
situation in relation to the problem of air pollution is sufficiently
319
unique to justify the disparate treatment.
It is not my intent here to answer such questions. My object is
only to identify them, and to note that there will be, no doubt,
situations in which federal laws that afford more (or less) sovereignty
to some states than others will still be constitutional. This is yet
another reason why the equal sovereignty principle is less
revolutionary than critics have suggested. And it is yet another reason
why the existence of the equal sovereignty principle is not fatally
undermined by the litany of unequal federal statutes identified by
320
critics.
314. See Colby, supra note 11, at 342–43.
315. See id. at 343–45.
316. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)–(b) (2012).
317. See Brader, supra note 83, at 121.
318. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1380–
81.
319. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 281, 314 (“The prospect of fifty separate standards for automobiles is untenable.
But California has unique air pollution problems and an economy large enough to support
separate standards.”); id. at 311 (noting that California “is probably unique in the country in the
amount of expertise and sophistication it has developed in the regulation of auto emissions”);
Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 713–21 (2003) (explaining California’s unique air
pollution problems and Congress’s reasons for affording special leeway to that state).
320. Most of those statutes, as noted above, do not even trigger equal sovereignty concerns
at all. But even those that do might well still be constitutional. For instance, Professor Price
identifies “[a] statute from the early years of the Republic [which] granted jurisdiction over

COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1158

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2016 10:25 PM

[Vol. 65:1087

It is at this stage of the inquiry—whether the “departure from
the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” is justified by the fact
that the “statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently
321
related to the problem that it targets” —that the critics of Shelby
322
County should focus their objections. The Court concluded that,
although the coverage formula used to determine which states were
subject to the statute’s onerous restrictions on election lawmaking
was justified in 1965, when the Voting Rights Act was first enacted,
that formula was no longer justified in 2006, when the law was
323
reauthorized. Because the coverage formula continued to be “based
on decades-old data and eradicated practices,” including the past use
of “literacy tests” that “have been banned nationwide for over 40
years,” and on disparities in minority “voter registration and turnout
in the 1960s and early 1970s” that no longer persisted, the Court
found that the 2006 reauthorization statute’s disparate geographic
coverage was not sufficiently related to the problem of twenty-first324
century racial discrimination in voting that it targeted. But, as
Justice Ginsburg explained, Congress, prior to the 2006
reauthorization, held extensive hearings, amassed voluminous
evidence, and made specific findings that racial discrimination in
voting remains a serious and widespread problem in the covered
certain federal revenue offenses only to specified state courts in New York and Pennsylvania.”
Price, supra note 24, at 29 n.26. It may well be that that “statute’s disparate geographic coverage
[was] sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). The statute empowered state courts only in frontier counties
that were uniquely and impractically far from the nearest federal courts:
[The legislative] committee further observe [sic], that the revenue districts on the
northern frontier are at a distance of between three and four hundred miles of the
place of residence of the district judges and of the district courts; that any petitioners
from those districts would be forced to travel from six to eight hundred miles with
their evidences [sic], in order to avail themselves of the benefits contemplated by the
law; that the persons who are liable to infringe the laws of the United States, on
account of their local situation, are generally poor, or in very moderate
circumstances; that they have not the ability to bear the expenses of so long a journey.
15 ANNALS OF CONG. 330–31 (Jan. 1806) (statement of Rep. Sailly).
321. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203.
322. The Voting Rights Act clearly implicates equal sovereignty because the covered
“[s]tates [alone] must beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that
they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own.” Shelby Cty. v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013). “While one State waits months or years and expends funds to
implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically put the same law into effect
immediately, through the normal legislative process.” Id.
323. See id. at 2627–28.
324. Id.; see also id. at 2629 (“Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. It
cannot rely simply on the past.”).
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jurisdictions. Whether Congress’s evidence was good enough to
justify the continued use of the old coverage formula, rather than a
326
fresh formula crafted anew to address current conditions, is a hard
question about the past and present state of racial discrimination in
voting across the country—one that is made even more complicated
by the fact that it is difficult to tell whether improved conditions in
the covered jurisdictions today are the result of the continuing
operation of the Voting Rights Act, as opposed to evidence that the
327
act is no longer needed. This is not an issue that I will tackle here.
My point is only that one can accept the equal sovereignty principle
while still believing that Shelby County was wrongly decided.
C. Equal Sovereignty and the Reconstruction Amendments
Indeed, there is a strong argument—the possibility of which was
ignored by the Shelby County majority—that the courts should be
more forgiving of violations of the equal sovereignty principle in the
context of federal civil-rights laws, like the Voting Rights Act, that
were enacted pursuant to the Reconstruction amendments. As
Professor Mark Graber explains, “One of the most remarkable
features of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion . . . in Shelby County . . . is
the almost complete absence of any reference to the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Civil War, or anything
328
that happened during Reconstruction.” The Court’s opinion reads
as though “the Civil War and Reconstruction never occurred or, as

325. See id. at 2635–36, 2639–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Ellen D. Katz et al.,
Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, University of Michigan Law School,
39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 650–52 (2005) (seeking to demonstrate that the coverage formula
accurately identifies the jurisdictions in which racial discrimination remains most prevalent).
326. Cf. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE
L.J. 174, 208 (2007) (suggesting that “the coverage formula . . . is both overinclusive and
underinclusive of jurisdictions of concern with respect to their record of minority voting rights
violations” and that, “[a]t least in the abstract, . . . it is difficult to defend a formula which, for
example, covers counties in Michigan and New Hampshire, but does not cover the counties in
Ohio and Florida with the most notorious voting rights violations in recent elections” (footnote
omitted)).
327. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If the statute was
working, there would be less evidence of discrimination, so opponents might argue that
Congress should not be allowed to renew the statute.”).
328. Mark Graber, The Missing Amendments, BALKINIZATION (June 25, 2013, 11:00 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-missing-amendments.html [http://perma.cc/2D7L-D8
BH].
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the Dunning School maintained, they were blots on American
329
constitutionalism that ought to be erased.”
But, of course, the Civil War and Reconstruction did happen.
And they did work profound changes in American
330
constitutionalism. One might take a very expansive view of that
change, opining that it effectively eradicated the notion of state
331
sovereignty altogether, but of course the Supreme Court has never
332
countenanced that suggestion, and certainly not of late. More
productively, one might argue that, although the Reconstruction
amendments did not annihilate state sovereignty altogether, they did
work significant alterations to the structure of federalism, one of
which was the total elimination of the structural principle of equal

329. Id. The Dunning School was a school of historical thought founded at Columbia
University by historian William Dunning and political scientist and law professor John W.
Burgess. See Fishkin, supra note 6, at 183–84. The Dunning School perpetuated a twisted
narrative pursuant to which the Radical Republicans in Congress, consumed by a vicious
passion for revenge, forced oppressive and tyrannical misrule upon a victimized Southern
people (whose just cause was simply state sovereignty, rather than white supremacy). See id.
330. See Hasen, supra note 6, at 732 (“[C]onspicuously absent from the majority opinion is
any real appreciation of how the Civil War amendments, including the Fifteenth Amendment,
changed the state-federal balance of power and the scope of the Tenth Amendment.”); Katyal
& Schmidt, supra note 5, at 2134 (“If [the equal sovereignty principle] is a structural inference,
how can it be squared with the Reconstruction Amendments, which had specifically authorized
massive (and unequal) federal intrusions into the States to protect the rights of newly freed
slaves?”).
331. See Dunning, supra note 63, at 425 (“No argument based in any particular upon the
principle of state-sovereignty can ever again be tolerated in the arena of constitutional debate.
Our fundamental law must always henceforth be viewed as the expression of a nation’s will.”).
332. Beginning with The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the Court has generally
insisted that the Reconstruction amendments were not “so great a departure from the structure
and spirit of our institutions,” did not “degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the
most ordinary and fundamental character,” and did not “radically change[] the whole theory of
the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments
to the people.” See id. at 78. As an historical matter, I am not unsympathetic to the argument
that the Court has it wrong. Cf. Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1644–52 (2013) (detailing the extent to which
the Southern states, which were forced at gunpoint to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,
viewed it as radically reworking the very nature of the American system of government and
utterly destroying the institution of state sovereignty). But cf. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–77, at 242 (1988) (explaining that moderate
Republicans generally “did not believe the legitimate rights of the states had been destroyed, or
the traditional principles of federalism eradicated,” as a result of the Civil War); id. at 259
(explaining that, in framing the Fourteenth Amendment, “few Republicans wished to break
completely with the principles of federalism”).
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sovereignty among the states. After all, the rebel states’ readmission
to the Union after the war was conditioned on their capitulating to a
mandate that they could never amend their state constitutions so as to
334
abridge the right of black suffrage. As this occurred two years prior
to the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the sovereignty of the
Southern states was thereby restricted in a way that the sovereignty of
the Northern states was not. And this was a particularly egregious
disparity, in light of the fact that most of the Northern states did not,
335
in fact, grant voting rights to blacks at the time. One might read
these events—in conjunction with the many other (deserved)
indignities visited uniquely upon the South after the war—as
indicating that the equal sovereignty principle simply did not survive
336
the reshaping of federalism during Reconstruction.
But that seems a bridge too far, for a number of reasons. First,
most of the equal footing cases—with their aggressive enforcement of
equal sovereignty for newly admitted states, and their unambiguous
rhetoric of equal sovereignty for all states—were decided after
337
Reconstruction. Second, Congress had been recalcitrantly trying to
impose on newly admitted states conditions that are inconsistent with
338
the equal sovereignty principle since long before the Civil War.
Congress’s failure to respect that principle (or the equal footing
doctrine) in admitting (or readmitting) states during and after the war
does not seem to have been dictated or facilitated by a paradigm shift
333. Indeed, Professor Dunning himself, the namesake of the Dunning School, authored an
article in 1888 suggesting that recent Congressional activity had rendered the notion of equal
sovereignty “finally defunct,” though he suggested that it could be revived by the courts. See
Dunning, supra note 63, at 452; Fishkin, supra note 6, at 184.
334. Biber, supra note 66, at 143–44.
335. See AMAR, supra note 83, at 374 (“In 1865, only a handful of Northern states allowed
blacks to vote.”); FONER, supra note 332, at 447 (“[T]he Northern states during Reconstruction
actually abridged the right to vote more extensively than the Southern.”).
336. See Vik Kanwar, A Fugitive from the Camp of the Conquerors: The Revival of Equal
Sovereignty Doctrine in Shelby County v. Holder, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 272,
288 (2015) (stating that the equal sovereignty principle “definitively ended at the time of
Reconstruction”). Joseph Fishkin elaborates,
To remember what actually happened between 1861 and 1870 is to remember a
shattered nation reconstructed on new foundations, where the terms of readmission
of the conquered South were based, fundamentally, not on principles of equal
sovereignty, but on military conquest, surrender, and occupation. It is to remember a
series of amendments that remade the . . . constitutional order on new terms far less
amenable to claims of either the sovereign dignity or the equality of the Southern
states.
Fishkin, supra note 6, at 179–80 (footnote omitted).
337. See supra Part II.A.
338. See supra Part I.C; supra note 114.
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during Reconstruction. Third, Republican leaders argued during
Reconstruction that it was permissible to mandate suffrage for
Southern blacks, even while Northern blacks could not vote, because
blacks were only a tiny percentage of the population in the North, but
were a huge percentage of the population (in some states, a majority)
339
in the South. Thus, in the South, but not in the North, racial
discrimination in the franchise effectively established a nonrepublican
form of government. And the Constitution not only allows Congress
to act in those circumstances, but affirmatively obligates Congress to
340
ensure that all states maintain a republican form of government.
Whatever one thinks about the strength of that argument, it was
offered as a justification for a particular incident of unequal
sovereignty, rather than a claim of an unfettered right to discriminate.
In addition, there were many in Congress, including some of the
leading Republicans who voted for the acts of Southern readmission,
who viewed the conditions imposed as inconsistent with the essential
341
principle of equal sovereignty and fully expected that the courts
339. See AMAR, supra note 83, at 374–76.
340. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”); Amar, supra note 181, at 112–13 (“At a
certain point, states with abysmal track records could be deemed unrepublican within the
meaning of Article IV, and Congress had broad powers to enforce that Article’s promise of
republican government . . . .”).
341. Recounting the views of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Trumbull explained,
I did not believe this could be a Union of unequal States. I believe that when a State
is entitled to representation in this Union, and becomes one of the States of the
Union, it is a full and complete State, with all the rights in all respects of every other
State. I want the State of Mississippi here as a full-grown State. I want its
representatives to stand up in the Congress of the United States as the
representatives of a coequal State of the Union, and not of an inferior and
subordinate State, or a State with conditions imposed upon it not imposed upon the
other States of the Union.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1174 (1870) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2211 (1868) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (“I oppose this,
because . . . there is nothing in the Constitution of the country that authorizes it.”); CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2739 (1868) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (arguing that, although
there are no “express terms to be found in the Constitution declaring the equality of the States,”
it is nonetheless “clear, beyond all reasonable doubt” from structure and history that the states
retain equal sovereignty, and asserting that the conditions regarding the franchise imposed on
the Southern states cannot be squared with that constitutional mandate). For examples of fiery
speeches by Democrats opposing these conditions on equal sovereignty grounds, see, for
instance, CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2927–28 (1868) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury);
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2606 (1868) (statement of Sen. Buckalew) (insisting on the
paramount need to “maintain as a settled, as an invaluable principle, that each State, under the
legislation of Congress, shall stand the peer and equal of every other”); CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2195 (1868) (statement of Sen. Kerr) (arguing that these conditions will “admit
into the Union a State inferior in most vital powers to her sister States. The great bond and
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would therefore never treat them as valid. Indeed, that is, in part,
why we have the Fifteenth Amendment. Imposing permanent
suffrage for blacks as a condition for readmitting the Southern states
initially allowed Congress to ensure perpetual voting equality in the
343
South without having to impose the same mandate on the North. “If
there had been no doubt as to the validity and unalterable character
of such a condition,” one historian has explained, “it would have
made the Fifteenth Amendment . . . unnecessary. The fear was freely
expressed, however, that the theory of the equality of the States was
precious principle of equality, of equal statehood in the Union, is broken, is rejected, and a
hateful Union of unequal members is to be established”); id. at 2196 (noting “the essential
principles of the equality of State governments, of equal self-government, which have always
characterized the legislation of the country”). For an example of a radical Republican
passionately rejecting the notion of equal sovereignty, see CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
3025 (1868) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (“The song of State Rights has for its constant refrain
the asserted Equality of the States. Is it not strange that words so constantly employed, as a
cover for pretensions against Human Rights, cannot be found in the Constitution?”).
342. Senator Trumbull further explained,
The States of this Union must be equal in all their rights as members of the Federal
Union, or you cannot preserve it. Such is the Constitution; such is the language of the
acts by which new States have been admitted; and though I have voted for the
admission of States here with conditions imposed I have done it because I was in
favor of the admission of the States, and a majority of the Senate insisted upon
imposing the conditions which, in my opinion, were of no validity whatever.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2699–700 (1868) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also id.
at 640 (“I am so anxious to see Virginia and all these States restored that I am willing to vote for
the bill when the Senate put conditions on over my vote if I think those conditions are
inoperative . . . .”); id. (“I shall be compelled to vote for the motion, because I regarded it as a
condition that cannot be enforced.”); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 493 (1870) (statement
of Rep. Bingham) (declaring that, should the provision imposing conditions be enacted, the
Constitution would render it “as void as the paper on which it is printed”); id. (“Even on such
conditions, I say let the State come in, and let those who have undertaken to put fetters upon
her in violation of the Constitution stand responsible for that impotent endeavor. I wash my
hands of it.”); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 514–16 (1870) (statement of Sen. Fowler)
(championing the equal sovereignty principle and then declaring that “these conditions have not
even the form or the sanction or the respectability or the appearance of law; they can never be
enforced; they are worthless in every respect”); cf. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 2700
(1868) (statement of Sen. Henderson) (indicating his agreement that the imposed condition was
unconstitutional, but refusing to vote for the bill because of the possibility that “the Supreme
Court may say that it is not a provision inimical or hostile to the Constitution; that it does not
contravene the Constitution, and that therefore we may constitutionally impose it. The Senator
from Illinois [Trumbull] may be right, but he may be wrong.”).
343. JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 17–18 (1909); Republican Party Platform of 1868 (May 20, 1868), THE AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29622 [http://perma.cc/5QVQZX62] (“The guaranty by Congress of equal suffrage to all loyal men at the South was
demanded by every consideration of public safety, of gratitude, and of justice, and must be
maintained; while the question of suffrage in all the loyal States properly belongs to the people
of those States.”).
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too deeply rooted in our constitutional system ever to make the
344
observance of such a condition practically enforceable.” Thus, the
Reconstruction Congress pursued the Fifteenth Amendment,
which—importantly—did not seek to de-constitutionalize the equal
sovereignty principle, but rather sought to solve the suffrage problem
according to that principle, by prohibiting racial discrimination in
345
voting nationwide.
Indeed, it was likely not possible to resolve the issue by
amending the Constitution to explicitly de-constitutionalize the equal
sovereignty principle. Due to the strictures of Article V, the
Constitution could not be amended without the support of some of
346
the Southern states. It is difficult to believe that any of them would
have gone along voluntarily, and forced ratification at gunpoint—the
347
method employed for the Fourteenth Amendment —was no longer
344. MATHEWS, supra note 343, at 18; see also id. at 20 (noting that, once Radical
Reconstruction would come to an end, “the only remaining security for negro suffrage in the
South lay in the extent to which fundamental conditions of readmission had rendered the
reconstruction constitutions [of the Southern states] unalterable in respect to suffrage.
Confidence in the validity of these conditions was now perceptibly on the wane”); CONG.
GLOBE 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2666 (1868) (Sen. Conkling) (“[I]t will hardly do for the Congress
of the United States to make a blank motion . . . confessedly . . . in violation of the Constitution
of the United States. . . . We all know that inwrought with the genius of our Government,
imbedded in our organism, written in the Constitution again and again, is the equality of the
States in all the attributes attaching to States as such.”); 1 ROGER FOSTER, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 53, at 331 & n.9 (1895) (noting that the Supreme
Court’s equal footing decisions in cases like Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845), and
Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1857)—discussed supra Part II.A—rendered these
conditions “inoperative upon the power of those States to amend their constitutions so as to
restrict the right of suffrage”); Whittington, supra note 114, at 1315 (noting that the Supreme
Court’s antebellum equal footing “decisions did not stop Congress from using its statehood
enabling acts (and comparable bills) to make declarations about what the future states could
‘never’ do, but it was now widely understood . . . that such declarations had no legal force. They
were symbolic and hortatory. The courts would not enforce the supremacy of federal law in such
cases”); Editorial, Amending the Constitution, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1868, at 4 (endorsing the
Fifteenth Amendment because the uncertainty about Congress’s powers “can best be set at rest
by a Constitutional Amendment”).
345. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. App. 101–02 (1869) (statement of Rep.
Hamilton) (arguing in support of the Fifteenth Amendment on the ground that “[e]quality of
the States, their ‘equal footing’ in their relations to the General Government, must . . . be
maintained,” and asserting, “[o]ur ears are still ringing with cry from the [Democratic Party] . . .
that ‘universal suffrage was forced upon the South.’ I acknowledge the fact, and I shall never
rest, God helping me, until it is forced upon the North in the same way!”); MATHEWS, supra
note 343, at 18–19.
346. See Colby, supra note 332, at 1643–44 (noting that “a mere ten states voting no would
have been enough to defeat” an amendment and there were “eleven former Confederate
states”).
347. See id. passim.
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an option, as most of the Southern states had already been readmitted
and military rule had ended. What is more, even the Northern
Republicans were embarrassed about having violated the equal
sovereignty principle. As James G. Blaine, a House Republican from
Maine who soon became Speaker of the House, recalls,
[t]he evasive and disreputable position in regard to suffrage, taken
by the National Republican Convention that nominated General
Grant in 1868, was keenly felt and appreciated by the members of
the party when subjected to popular discussion. There was
something so obviously unfair and unmanly in the proposition to
impose negro suffrage on the Southern States by National power,
and at the same time leave the Northern States free to decide the
question for themselves, that the Republicans became heartily
ashamed of it long before the political canvass had closed. When
Congress assembled, immediately after the election of General
Grant, there was found to be a common desire and a common
purpose among Republicans to correct the unfortunate position in
which the party had been placed by the National Convention; and to
that end it was resolved that suffrage, as between the races, should
by organic law be made impartial in all the States of the Union—
348
North as well as South.

After all, as Representative John Bingham—perhaps the
349
Reconstruction Era’s most influential congressional Republican —
explained in the course of denouncing attempts to limit the Southern
states’ sovereignty, “equality of men and States before the law, was
the watchword, the central, informing, vital thought of the
350
Republican party.”

348. 2 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 412–13 (1886).
349. See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1–2 (2013).
350. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 493 (1870) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (emphasis
added); see Schmitt, supra note 19. A similar sentiment was offered by Gideon Welles, President
Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy:
Where is the authority for Congress . . . to prescribe new conditions to one of the . . .
States . . . ? Where is the authority for the President or Congress to deprive her of
rights reserved and guaranteed to all, — to dictate her local policy, — these restrictive
conditions being new, not a part of the Federal compact or known to the
Constitution. The States must have equal political rights or the government cannot
stand on the basis of 1789. . . . The Federal Government has no warrant to impose
conditions on any of the States to which all are not subjected . . . .
1 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES 411, 414 (1911) (Aug. 22, 1863).

COLBY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1166

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2016 10:25 PM

[Vol. 65:1087

Finally, the notion that the Southern states “reentered the
351
Union” during Reconstruction —and did so upon terms affording
them less sovereignty than the other states—does not accord with the
official story. The official story was that the Southern states did not
have to be readmitted into the Union, because they never left it in the
first place. All along, the North’s fundamental theory of the war was
352
that the Southern states had never lawfully seceded. The North
claimed that the entire purpose of the war had been “to preserve the
Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States
353
unimpaired.”
In sum, as a leading historian of Reconstruction has explained,
if the Civil War created the national state and Reconstruction added
the idea of a national citizenry whose common rights no state could
abridge, most Republicans still believed the states retained rights
beyond the scope of federal intervention, and expected the relatively

351. Fishkin, supra note 6, at 179.
352. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 113–14 (1998). The
Northerners refused to seat the Southern representatives in Congress until such time as the
Southern states formed republican governments that satisfied the Congress. But they treated
the Southern states as part of the Union the entire time, and therefore included them within the
denominator in calculating when the Reconstruction amendments had been ratified by the
necessary three-fourths of the states and therefore became part of the Constitution. See id.;
Colby, supra note 332, at 1682.
353. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1861) (emphasis added); see also WELLES,
supra note 350, at 414:
We are testing the strength and inviolability of a written constitution. To impose
conditions on the States which are in rebellion is allowable on no other premise than
that they actually seceded and left the Union. Now, while it is admitted and we all
know that a majority of the people in certain States have rebelled and made war on
the central government, none of us recognize or admit the right or principle of
secession. People—individuals—have rebelled but the States are sovereignties, not
corporations, and they still belong to and are a part of the Union. We can imprison,
punish, hang the Rebels by law and constitutional warrant, but where is the authority
or power to chastise a State, or to change its political status, deprive it of political
rights and sovereignty which other States possess?
; see also id. at 415 (“The constitutional relations of the States have not been changed by the
Rebellion, but the personal condition of every Rebel is affected. The two are not identical. The
rights of the States are unimpaired; the rights of those who have participated in the Rebellion
may have been forfeited.”). This may explain the relevance of the Northwest Austin Court’s
citation of Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), in support of the equal sovereignty
principle. See supra note 40. White held that the Southern states had never lawfully seceded
from the Union because ours is “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” 74
U.S. at 725. Since, at its core, “‘[t]his Union’ was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity
and authority,” Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911); see also supra note 177, the fact that
the Union was held in 1869 to be “indestructible” suggests that nothing that happened during or
after the Civil War could change its fundamental character as a union of equal sovereigns.
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rapid return of the Southern states as equal members of the
354
Union.

Still, the fact remains that the Reconstruction Congress believed
that the Southern states were still states, and yet at times selfconsciously afforded them less sovereignty than it afforded to the
355
Northern states. (Indeed, Congress afforded them no sovereignty
rights at all during the initial phase of Radical Reconstruction,
disbanding their governments and placing them under temporary
356
military rule. ) This is surely significant—not as an outright
repudiation of the constitutional commitment to equal sovereignty,
but rather as an indication that slavery, attempted secession, the
Black Codes, and the many other racist sins of the South sometimes
justified targeted departures from that general commitment.
It was in this arena—civil rights—that Reconstruction worked
profound changes in American federalism. Reconstruction probably
did not radically alter the basic architecture of federalism generally,
including the inherent structural principle of equal state
357
sovereignty, but it did bring about a sea change in the federal–state
balance in one particular regard: the ability of the federal government
to protect the fundamental rights of the people from state
358
infringement.
And it was in service of this goal that the
Reconstruction Congress both felt the need to create new federal
powers and felt entitled, under the circumstances, to sometimes limit
354. FONER, supra note 332, at 277; see also AMAR, supra note 83, at 379 (noting that even
those Republicans, in the minority of their party, who were inclined not to count the rebel states
in the Article V denominator “proposed to nurse the South back into republican health, much
as predecessor Congresses had weaned young territories into proper states to be thereafter
admitted on equal footing” (emphasis added)).
355. For instance, some Southern states were precluded, as a condition for reseating their
representatives, from ever amending their state constitutions to abridge the right to hold office
or the right to access to an education. FONER, supra note 332, at 452.
356. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 428; Colby, supra note 332, at 1652–53.
357. Cf. Abigail B. Molitor, Comment, Understanding Equal Sovereignty, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
1839, 1865 (2014) (“By the close of the Reconstruction era, most Americans agreed that the
states held a position subordinate to the national government; nonetheless, the question of what
exactly that position was or whether all states held it equally remained open.”).
358. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 82 (1991) (arguing
that the constitutional transformation of Reconstruction was a “quantum leap . . . in
nationalizing the protection of individual rights against state abridgment”; the “question was no
longer whether state sovereignty was more important than individual rights, but which
individual rights were sufficiently fundamental to warrant national protection”); FONER, supra
note 332, at 259 (explaining that Republicans viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as not
radically altering the principles of federalism, but rather as empowering the federal government
only when the states failed to protect individual rights).
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the sovereignty of only the Southern states. Recall that, with the
Connecticut Compromise, the framers of the original Constitution
intended to preserve both the equal sovereignty of the states and the
359
equal sovereignty of the people. Reconstruction can be viewed as
altering the federalist system to prioritize, to some degree, the latter
360
goal over the former. Thus, the history supports a claim that
Congress should be afforded greater leeway to bend the equal
sovereignty principle when it is acting pursuant to its Thirteenth,
361
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers.
And recent caselaw supports that claim as well. In defining
Congress’s enforcement powers under those amendments, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that geographic tailoring
362
renders a law more likely to be upheld, rather than less. In City of
363
Boerne v. Flores, for instance, the Court, in partially striking down
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1994 (RFRA), declared
that the national
reach and scope of RFRA distinguish it from other measures passed
under Congress’[s] enforcement power, even in the area of voting
rights. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the challenged provisions
were confined to those regions of the country where voting
discrimination had been most flagrant . . . . [L]imitations of this kind
tend to ensure Congress’[s] means are proportionate to ends
364
legitimate under § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment].
365

Similarly, in United States v. Morrison, the Court refused to
uphold the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) under

359. See supra Part III.B.
360. Cf. supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (noting the views of many Federalists
that individual rights were more important than state sovereignty).
361. Cf. Amar, supra note 181, at 114 (“This general history of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments . . . supports broad congressional power to administer strong and even selective
medicine to individual states with poor democratic track records—the exact sort of medicine
employed by . . . the Voting Rights Act.”); id. at 118 (arguing that, even after Reconstruction,
disparate treatment of the states can violate “proper principles of federalism and state equality,”
but that “Congress can properly require . . . states with especially sorry democratic track records
to meet the proper standards tailor-made to address the unique historical lapses in these specific
jurisdictions”).
362. See Greenbaum et al., supra note 6, at 850 (noting several cases in which the Supreme
Court “appears to have viewed the limited geographic scope [of a law] as a virtue of Section 5,
not a vice”).
363. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
364. Id. at 532–33.
365. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, in part
because the law “applies uniformly throughout the Nation,” even
though “Congress’[s] findings indicate that the problem of
discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does
366
not exist in all States, or even most States.” “By contrast,” the Court
explained, “in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the remedy was directed
only to those States in which Congress found that there had been
discrimination. For these reasons, we conclude that Congress’[s]
367
power under § 5 does not extend to the enactment of [VAWA].”
There is a way in which the combination of these cases and
Shelby County seems perverse and hypocritical. These opinions were
crafted by the very same bloc of Justices who formed the majority in
368
Shelby County. Yet in tandem, they seem to create a no-win
situation for civil-rights laws. If the law applies nationwide, it is not
sufficiently targeted to be permissible under the Reconstruction
amendments, but if the law is geographically targeted, it violates the
principle of equal sovereignty among the states.
But there is, I believe, a way to reconcile the equal sovereignty
principle with the earlier cases. Geographic tailoring of the type that
denies equal sovereignty is generally prohibited by the Constitution,
for all of the reasons discussed in this Article. But when Congress acts
to enforce the Reconstruction amendments, such tailoring is not only
369
permissible, it is arguably preferable. The new federal powers
established by those amendments are strong medicine, and strong
medicine should be applied topically only where needed; these
366. Id. at 626.
367. Id. at 626–27 (citations omitted).
368. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I would
not . . . abandon the requirement that Congress may impose prophylactic § 5 legislation only
upon those particular States in which there has been an identified history of relevant
constitutional violations.”); Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741–42 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting):
There is no guilt by association, enabling the sovereignty of one State to be abridged
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because of violations by another State, or by
most other States, or even by 49 other States. . . . Congress has sometimes displayed
awareness of this self-evident limitation. That is presumably why the most sweeping
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . were restricted to States “with a
demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting.”
(citations omitted) (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980)).
369. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (“This is not to say, of course that § 5 legislation
requires . . . geographic restrictions . . . . Where, however, a congressional enactment pervasively
prohibits constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state
action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress’s means are proportionate to ends
legitimate under § 5.”).
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powers often call for a certain amount of unequal sovereignty. Still,
precisely because it runs counter to a fundamental principle of
constitutional structure—a principle that Congress sought to preserve
when it enacted the Reconstruction amendments—Congress’s ability
to use those powers unequally is circumscribed. Congress might be
expected to pass geographically targeted legislation, but it is also
expected (indeed obligated) to be able to justify its decision to draw
the geographic lines in the way that it did. The yardstick for
measuring whether Congress has adequately done so—the standard
of scrutiny to which the courts should subject Congress’s line
drawing—should be less rigorous in these contexts than in others. To
obligate Congress to discriminate when it exercises these powers and
then turn around and treat its enactments as presumptively invalid
because of their discriminatory nature would make little sense, and
would effectively gut essential federal powers—powers that were
obtained the hard way, through a bloody Civil War in which more
370
than 600,000 Americans lost their lives. But, because of the
importance of equal sovereignty to the structure of the
Constitution—even as modified by the Civil War—more than a mere
371
rational basis should be required.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Shelby County v. Holder is far
from perfect. But its faults do not include its declaration that “[n]ot
only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also
372
a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States.”
That assertion has been much disparaged. But it is not novel. And it is
correct. In the words of James Madison, it is constitutionally
“impossible for Congress,” whether it is dealing with “new or old

370. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 854
(1988).
371. It seems quite possible that the Court in Shelby County, in failing to acknowledge the
distinctiveness of the Reconstruction powers, ended up employing an unduly stringent standard,
and that the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula, despite its imperfections, should have
survived the proper (more forgiving) scrutiny. But again, resolving those questions necessitates
an inquiry into the state of racial discrimination around the country that is beyond the scope of
this Article.
372. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (citations and emphasis omitted).
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members of the Union, to vary the political equality of the States.”
As the Supreme Court itself explained more than a century ago,
the whole Federal system is based upon the fundamental principle of
the [sovereign] equality of the States under the Constitution. The
idea that one State is debarred, while the others are granted, the
privilege of amending their organic laws to conform to the wishes of
their inhabitants, is so repugnant to the theory of their equality
374
under the Constitution, that it cannot be entertained . . . .

373. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 65 (1848) (letter of Nov. 16, 1820, from
Madison to Monroe).
374. Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 89 (1900).

